Volume 62

Issue 5

Article 4

12-15-2017

In Police We Trust
Rachel Moran

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 Vill. L. Rev. 953 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss5/4

This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Moran: In Police We Trust

2017]
IN POLICE WE TRUST
RACHEL MORAN*
INTRODUCTION

I

N the opening episode of the extraordinary 2016 documentary O.J.:
Made in America, Joe Saltzman—a professor at the University of Southern California during the 1960s, when O.J. Simpson played football
there—weighs in on the issue of Los Angeles police officers’ maltreatment
of black and brown Los Angeleños during that time period.1 “I didn’t
think it was a big deal,” says Saltzman.2 “I didn’t think these people were
being persecuted. I didn’t think these people had any problem . . . I was
as naı̈ve as any other white person.”3
Watching Professor Saltzman’s admission of naı̈veté called to mind
the ongoing attitude of incredulity many white people have displayed in
the wake of recent shootings of black men by police officers. After
Michael Brown (a black teenager) was shot and killed by Darren Wilson (a
white police officer) in September of 2014, a poll of residents in the St.
Louis area revealed a stark racial divide, with the majority of white residents opining that the shooting was justified, while an almost equal number of black residents concluded that it was not.4 Through 2015, as the
names and faces of Laquan McDonald, Tamir Rice, Akai Gurley, Walter
Scott, and Samuel DuBose—all black men or children gunned down by
* Clinical Teaching Fellow, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
Thanks to Professor Christopher N. Lasch for his thoughtful comments, and the
free-write at the 2016 AALS Clinical Conference that inspired this piece. Credit
for the title goes to Professor Robin Walker Sterling.
1. O.J.: MADE IN AMERICA (ESPN 2016). The five-episode documentary, which
uses O.J. Simpson’s life and murder trial as a means for discussing the broader
narrative of racial injustices in America, has been called “the best 30 for 30 documentary that the sports network has ever produced,” a “masterwork of scholarship,” and “the best thing [ESPN has] ever done.” See, e.g., John Breech, How to
Watch ESPN’s O.J. Simpson Documentary “O.J.: Made in America”, CBSSPORTS.COM
(June 9, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/how-to-watch-the-o-j-simpson-documentary-o-j-made-in-america/[https://perma.cc/KP7B-2CFE]; Spencer
Hall, O.J. Simpson Documentary Is the Best Thing ESPN Has Ever Done, SBNATION (June
6, 2016), http://www.sbnation.com/2016/6/6/11759814/espn-oj-simpson-documentary-made-in-america [https://perma.cc/E9CY-GMN8]; Mary McNamara, Why
“O.J.: Made in America” Might Be the First Television Show to Win an Oscar, L.A. TIMES
(May 20, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/la-et-st-oj-made-inamerica-tv-review-20160505-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/TTU2-KH5T].
2. O.J.: MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at Episode 1, 20:18–21; see also id. at
22:40 (identifying Saltzman as a USC professor).
3. Id. at Episode 1, 20:21–28.
4. See Jamelle Bouie, Tale of Two Fergusons, SLATE (Sept. 16, 2014, 05:47 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/09/st_louis_
blacks_and_white_disagree_on_michael_brown_s_killing_hold_almost.html
[http://perma.cc/V7U3-UBNW].

(953)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 4

954

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 953

police officers5—became rallying cries for communities of color, many
white scholars and citizens alike continued to insist that the police were
being unfairly maligned.6 And when, after the July 2016 fatal shootings of
Alton Sterling and Philando Castile—two more black men killed by white
police officers7—Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton called
on white people to “listen[ ] to the legitimate cries coming from our African-American fellow citizens,” she was widely mocked and accused of “pandering to the African-American community.”8
The archetype of police officers as good-hearted heroes who do no
wrong is a common one among members of the American racial majority.9
5. See Ashley Fantz & Holly Yan, Dash Cam Video Shows the Moments Before South
Carolina Police Shooting, CNN (Apr. 9, 2015, 07:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/04/09/us/south-carolina-police-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/T4ZT3MNA]; Dana Ford & Ed Payne, Ex-University Cop in Samuel DuBose Shooting Death
Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (July 31, 2015, 12:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/
30/us/ohio-sam-dubose-tensing [https://perma.cc/9CRC-7BQD]; J. David Goodman & Vivian Yee, Officer Charged in Akai Gurley Case Debated Reporting Gunshot, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02//
nyregion/akai-gurley-shooting-death-arraignment.html [https://perma.cc/8ABBGWAL]; Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in
Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BY4D-EJT3]; Warning, Graphic Content:
Laquan McDonald Shooting Dash-cam Video, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 22, 2016), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/85142730-132.html [https://perma.cc/EV84QQVD].
6. See, e.g., HEATHER MACDONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK
ON LAW AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016); Thomas Sowell, The Race
War No One Can Win, NAT’L REV. (July 13, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437703/the-war-on-cops-racism-allegations-are-largely-nonfactual [https://perma.cc/CK72-TGXD].
7. See Richard Fausset et al., Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice
Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/
06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J7ZBTWX9]; Rosa Flores & Catherine Shoichet, Philando Castile Shooting: What Happened
When Filming Stopped?, CNN (July 13, 2016, 10:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/07/13/us/police-shootings-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/8XQXU345].
8. See, e.g., After Dallas Shooting, Hillary Makes INSANE Statement About “White
People”, ENDING FED NEWS NETWORK (July 9, 2016), http://endingthefed.com/hillary-blames-cops-and-white-americans-for-the-deaths-of-young-black-men.html
[https://perma.cc/8LMK-YKEX]; Thomas Lifson, Hillary Implicitly Blames “White
People” for Police Shootings, AM. THINKER (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.american
thinker.com/blog/2016/09/hillary_implicitly_blames_white_people_for_police_
shootings.html [https://perma.cc/6GH5-H7W7].
9. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 58 (2010) (referencing popular television shows like
Law & Order that portray charismatic police officers heroically attempting to solve
terrible crimes, and act as “the fictional gloss placed on a brutal system of racialized oppression and control”); Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying?
Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 135, 143 (2002) (noting that Americans living in middle-class or predominantly white areas “are often personally unfamiliar with the policing done in
high-crime areas,” and do not understand harsh assessments of police conduct);
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A fall 2016 study by the Pew Research Center revealed that 75% of white
Americans believe that the police do “an excellent or good job” in treating
racial and ethnic minorities equally and holding officers accountable for
misconduct, while only one-third of black Americans believe the same.10
Our nation’s laws—drafted, enacted, and interpreted primarily by white
people who have rarely suffered the discomfiture of serving as an unwarranted target of police suspicion or brutality—also reflect this trust in the
inherent goodness of police officers.11 The American legal system, from
Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 678 (2007) (citing
research finding that deference to police officers is highest in areas with low crime
and effective policing); Radley Balko, The South Carolina Police Files: Gunslinging
Raids, Coverups and Magical Dog Sniffs, WASH. POST (May 31, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/05/31/the-south-carolina-policefiles-gunslinging-raids-coverups-and-magical-dog-sniffs/ [https://perma.cc/BCX5N73S] (exposing misconduct in South Carolina police forces, and quoting white
man saying, “I was sheltered, I guess. I had no idea how bad it was.”).
10. See Rich Morin & Renee Stepler, The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/
29/the-racial-confidence-gap-in-police-performance/ [https://perma.cc/44ZDUVST]; see also e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York,
in COMPARING THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE: NEW MODELS OF PARTICIPATION AND EXPERTISE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 203–05
(Thierry Delpeuch & Jacqueline E. Ross eds., 2016) (noting that, despite years of
unconstitutional stops and frisks by New York police officers, few people outside of
heavily-policed neighborhoods of color knew about the stops and searches); Erik
Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 176
(2009) (noting that “most Americans are unlikely to be stopped and frisked without good reason. The same cannot be said for others, particularly minority citizens.” (footnote omitted)); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 333, 333–36 (1998) (describing the country’s lengthy history of heavily
policing, patrolling, and controlling people of color); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 4–5
(2016), http://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/20160810_DOJ%
20BPD%20Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ29-HX46] (noting that Baltimore residents living in wealthier and largely white neighborhoods described police officers as generally “respectful and responsive to their needs,” while residents
of predominantly African-American communities said officers are often disrespectful and inattentive to requests for service); Nikole Hannah-Jones, A Letter From
Black America, POLITICO (Mar./Apr. 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2015/03/letter-from-black-america-police-115545 [https://perma.cc/ZAN9T46A] (quoting Khalil Gibran Muhammad, author of The Condemnation of Blackness, as saying, “White people, by and large, do not know what it is like to be occupied by a police force. They don’t understand it because it is not the type of
policing they experience.”).
11. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 9, at 149 (“Courts regularly presume that apprehending officers operate solely out of good motives and the desire to achieve
fairness; however, evidence shows that in high-crime areas, this presumption is
often false.”); Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth
Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23
CAP. U.L. REV. 151, 154–55 (1994) (noting in cases involving claims of police brutality against a black man, “[t]he playing field is unevenly tilted in favor of the
police officer, who is often viewed as a representative of the white male majority . . . . [T]he Supreme Court has fostered and promoted a paradigm that has
privileged the often white police officer with a presumption of innocence. This
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United States Supreme Court case law down to municipal ordinances, is
tremendously deferential to police officers’ actions and decisions.12
White Americans are, simply put, “still overwhelmingly supportive and
trustful of law enforcement.”13
As students of history should recognize, there is a problem with giving
people enormous amounts of physical and moral authority, and then deferring almost completely to their use of that authority. That problem, as
Lord John Acton warned Archbishop Creighton more than 130 years ago,
is that people given unchecked power are likely to abuse it, and to pick the
most politically unpopular and downtrodden as their victims.14 Sadly, in
the United States, people of color—and more specifically, African-Americans—have long been the subset of the population that law enforcement
authority are most likely to subjugate.15 Black people have, from the time
presumption of innocence contrasts with the presumption of guilt that burdens
black males and effectively undermines their ability to receive fair hearings in cases
turning on proof of police brutality, misconduct, or corruption.”).
12. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1883 (2015) (concluding that courts “all too readily defer” to
the judgments of police officers); Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in
Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408–09 (2013) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases in which the Court was faced with condemning or
deferring to police officers’ judgment and, in every case, chose to defer to the
officers’ actions or decisions).
13. Matt Taibbi, Why Baltimore Blew Up, ROLLING STONE (May 26, 2015), http:/
/www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-baltimore-blew-up-20150526 [https://
perma.cc/97NS-2UMG]. In contrast, “[u]nlike their no- or low-crime area counterparts, residents or visitors of high-crime areas consistently characterize their interactions with police as overwhelmingly adversarial; many such areas have turned
into virtual war zones.” Herbert, supra note 9, at 143 (footnote omitted); see also L.
Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035,
2074 (2011) (“Many within black communities perceive the constant stopping,
questioning, and searching of innocent individuals as harassment, which results in
distrust, anger, and other feelings not conducive to fostering good communitypolice relationships or perceptions of legitimacy . . . .”).
14. Lord Acton, also known by his birth name John Emerich Edward Dalberg,
is the person who coined the famous phrase, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute
power corrupts absolutely.” Lord Acton wrote this phrase in a letter chastising the
Church of England for its refusal to hold its spiritual leaders accountable for corruption and abuse. See Letter from Lord John Acton to Archbishop Mandell
Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887) (excerpted at http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/165acton.html [https://perma.cc/VD26-3GSP]). In the same letter, Lord
Acton wrote—less famously, but equally applicably to today’s concerns—“I cannot
accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with a
favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is
the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power increases.” See id.
15. See ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 20–22 (discussing historic subjugation of
African-Americans by those in power in the United States); Liyah Kaprice Brown,
Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegregation Fails As an Adequate Solution to Racist,
Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 757, 758–59 (2005); Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 245, 245 (2010) (arguing that one of the traditional functions of
police officers has been to create “ ‘white only’ space”); Linda Sheryl Greene, Before
and After Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH.
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they were first taken by force to live in this country centuries earlier, been
the subject of police antagonism, suspicion, and even violence in a way
white people en masse have simply never encountered.16
This Article examines the deferential attitude toward police departments and individual officers that our laws embody, as well as the detriments of that deference. Although the American justice system affords
police officers deference in many different areas, this piece looks at the
issue of deference primarily through the lens of police misconduct complaints.17 Specifically, when a citizen complains that a police officer has
mistreated her, that complaint is supposed to be thoroughly investigated
and, if found to be true, should result in repercussions for the offending
officer. In reality, most complaint review systems are so deferential to the
police that officers are very rarely held accountable in any meaningful way
for their misconduct. The people who suffer most from this lack of accountability are overwhelmingly people of color.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of deference to police officers in this country, and describes the trajectory our legal system has undergone from one at first deeply skeptical of law enforcement power, to
one that has in recent decades seized almost every possible opportunity to
defer to law enforcement “expertise.” Part II addresses deference in the
specific context of police misconduct complaints, and details the many
ways in which cities systematically give police officers the benefit of the
doubt when reviewing civilians’ complaints about those officers. Part III
analyzes the downsides of deference—particularly, evidence showing that
police departments do abuse their power, and that in so doing, they regularly target communities of color as the subjects of that abuse. Lastly, Part
IV proposes alternatives to the deference so ingrained in our current systems for reviewing police misconduct claims.
I. THE ORIGINS

OF

DEFERENCE

Deference, as Professor Daniel Solove defines it, refers to “the practice of accepting, without much questioning or skepticism, the factual and
U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 9–13 (2015) (discussing the country’s history of racialized violence inflicted by, or with the support of, the government against racial minorities); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659–60 (1994) (“being stopped for nothing—
or almost nothing—has become an all-too-common experience” for African-Americans and Hispanics); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 313–15 (1997) (describing
the “distinct[ive]ly different” and humiliating way police officers tend to treat people of color, as opposed to white people, during traffic stops).
16. Brown, supra note 15, at 758–59.
17. For an extended discussion regarding the flaws inherent in our current
systems of reviewing police misconduct complaints, see my earlier article, see generally Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837 (2016).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 4

958

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 953

empirical judgments made by the decisionmaker under review.”18 Professor Paul Horwitz provides a similar definition: “the substitution by a decisionmaker of someone else’s judgment for its own.”19
For purposes of this Article, and in the specific setting of discussing
police departments and officers, when I refer to deference I mean the
“presumption of rectitude that accompanies police activities and decisions.”20 In this context, deference occurs when a court (or any administrative body tasked with reviewing police conduct) fails to scrutinize
rigorously the decisions or actions of police officers.21 Often, this failure
to scrutinize is accompanied by the reviewing body expressing its reluctance to “second-guess” the police officer or “ ‘substitute’ its judgment” for
that of the police officer or department.22
A. History of Early Laws Expressing Distrust Toward
Law Enforcement Authorities
The United States has not always been deferential to police. To the
contrary, distrust of law enforcement was a hallmark of the pre-Revolutionary War colonies, and that distrust heavily influenced the founders of this
country.23 The colonists were particularly concerned with law enforcement intrusion via the infamous “writ[s] of assistance,” which gave British
law enforcement officers discretion to search and seize the colonists’ property.24 Blanket authority like this inspired John Adams to draft Article 14
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which served as a precursor to
the Fourth Amendment and recognized the right of all colonists to be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusions.25
Wariness about such unbridled law enforcement authority carried
over into the planning and drafting of the Constitution.26 Alexander
Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, wrote that those interpreting the Constitution were tasked with the role of guarding against “serious oppressions
18. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the
Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 946 (1999).
19. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061,
1061 (2008).
20. See Magee, supra note 11, at 173.
21. See id.
22. See Solove, supra note 18, at 943.
23. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 208–09 (1993); Magee, supra note 11, at 192; Amy D.
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 383, 397–98 (2001).
24. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 377–402 (2009); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’
CONSTITUTION 224 (1988); Brian D. Walsh, Note, Illinois v. Wardlow: High-Crime
Areas, Flight, and the Fourth Amendment, 54 ARK. L. REV. 879, 886–88 (2002).
25. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, Decl. of Rights, art. XIV; Walsh, supra note 24, at
887–88.
26. See Ronner, supra note 23, at 397–98.
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of the minor party in the community.”27 Other scholars have noted that
the Constitution generally showed that the fledgling United States did
“not tolerate the tactics of a police state,”28 and the Fourth Amendment
specifically served as a response to the “intense history of political oppression and tyranny by the British Crown over the colonists.”29 When the
Framers drafted the Constitution and the subsequent Bill of Rights, they
had in their minds an imperfect and untrustworthy government which, if
not kept in check, would disregard fundamental liberties, particularly the
liberties of minority groups lacking political power.30
Early United States Supreme Court precedent echoed this distrust of
law enforcement authority. In Boyd v. United States,31 the Supreme Court
rejected the government’s attempt to seize goods and papers from a criminal suspect without a warrant.32 In affirming the significance of both the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination, the Court has stated, “[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”33 The Court also cautioned against
granting law enforcement officials “arbitrary power” that could impinge
on the freedom of American citizens.34 Weeks v. United States,35 decided in
the early twentieth century, maintained a similar tenor of skepticism toward law enforcement attempts to circumvent the Constitution.36 The police officers in Weeks arrested the defendant without a warrant, went to his
home, and searched it without a warrant or the defendant’s consent.37 In
holding that evidence obtained from the defendant’s home could not be
used against him at trial, the Supreme Court commented on the “tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions,” and
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick, ed.
1987).
28. See Maclin, supra note 23, at 197.
29. See Magee, supra note 11, at 190; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Fourth Amendment was the “direct
constitutional response to the unreasonable law enforcement practices employed
by agents of the British Crown” (citations omitted)).
30. See Magee, supra note 11, at 192.
31. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), rejected by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967).
32. See id. at 624–28.
33. Ronner, supra note 23, at 397–98 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
34. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626–30.
35. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. See id. at 387–88.
37. See id. at 386.
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reiterated that abusive police practices “should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts.”38
While the Supreme Court continued to pay at least lip service to the
importance of protecting citizens against intrusive law enforcement, some
states—particularly those in the post-Reconstruction South—did not share
those concerns. In the decades after the Civil War, many southern cities
responded by dramatically increasing their police forces, and sending
those forces to police black people.39 These police forces in turn not only
tolerated, but often participated in, violence against black communities.40
Early to mid-twentieth century Supreme Court opinions responded to
these abuses by reiterating the importance of individual protections
against law enforcement abuses. Over the span of a few decades, particularly under the guidance of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme
Court—frustrated by southern state courts’ and legislatures’ failure to protect the rights of minorities in the Jim Crow era, and by police departments’ increasingly authoritarian model of policing—agreed to hear
numerous cases involving law enforcement abuses, and decided nearly all
of them in favor of defendants.41 These decisions collectively expanded
citizens’ ability to sue police departments for civil rights violations, guaranteed criminal defendants the right to counsel, provided that right to counsel during interrogations, required police officers to inform defendants of
their right to counsel and right to remain silent during interrogation, and
extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to misconduct by state
law enforcement authorities.42 As Professor David Sklansky has noted, the
“problem of police discretion,” and the decision to reign in that discretion
through careful judicial oversight, was perhaps the defining characteristic
of the Warren Court’s approach to policing cases.43
38. See id. at 392, 398.
39. See Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
820, 839 n.116 (1994) (citing EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 173 (1984)).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44
(1963); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961); see also
Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1889–90; Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 215–16 (2012)
(discussing these cases).
42. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68 (requiring police officers to warn criminal
suspects of their rights to counsel and to remain silent before conducting custodial
interrogations); Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91 (recognizing Sixth Amendment right
to counsel during police interrogations); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–44 (finding that
right to counsel is fundamental to fair trial and therefore obligatory upon states
under Fourteenth Amendment); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (holding exclusionary rule
applicable to states); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167 (holding that illegal actions of police
officers can constitute deprivation of civil rights); see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1889–90.
43. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1737
(2005).
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Today, Boyd and Weeks are no longer good law.44 Many of the protections afforded by the Warren Court have fallen out of favor, and the Supreme Court—and lower courts—share almost none of their earlier zeal
for protecting citizens against abusive law enforcement officers.45 More
than two centuries after the Framers enacted the Bill of Rights, American
police officers now enjoy broad discretion to search and seize without warrants, use force on the citizens they are intended to serve, and generally
act with little fear of being held accountable for mistreatment of the people they are ostensibly intended to serve and protect.46
B. The Shift Toward Deference
In the two-plus centuries since the Bill of Rights was enacted, the Supreme Court has, as Professor Carol Steiker notes, “clearly become less
sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more accommodating to
assertions of the need for public order.”47 The reason, many scholars
agree, is a troubling cocktail of political aspirations, the hysteria of the
“War on Drugs,” and outright racism.
Nearly all of the Warren Court’s most significant law enforcementrelated decisions—providing the right to counsel during interrogation, requiring police officers to warn suspects about their rights prior to interrogation, excluding evidence obtained by police misconduct, and expanding
the right to sue police officers for constitutional violations—occurred in
the early-to-mid-1960s.48 In 1968 Richard Nixon ran for president, making the nation’s rising crime rates and the Warren Court’s “pro-criminalrights decisions” one of the chief targets of his campaign.49 Nixon, who
ran on an anti-crime platform and at times revealed himself to be outright
racist,50 made four appointments to the Supreme Court during his five
44. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp, 367
U.S. at 643; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), rejected by Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
45. See infra Part I(B)–(C).
46. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural
Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 893 (2002);
Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal Procedure,
69 MD. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (2010); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at
1889–91; Harris, supra note 15, at 666.
47. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468 (1996).
48. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44
(1963); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–75 (1961).
49. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 3–4, 36 (2011); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1889–90.
50. See MCMAHON, supra note 49, at 3–4, 36; Dan Baum, Legalize It All,
HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 2016), http://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/
[https://perma.cc/WV8N-TNEX]; Rob Stein, New Nixon Tapes Reveal Anti-Semitic,
Racist Remarks, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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and one-half-year tenure.51 At the same time Richard Nixon was touting
his tough-on-crime agenda,52 he and other lawmakers, as well as law enforcement officials, also increasingly stepped up their rhetoric in support
of the now-infamous War on Drugs.53 For many politicians—particularly
those in the post-Jim Crow south—the drug war represented a new and
culturally-acceptable method of subjugating African-Americans, both individually by charging them with crimes that carried increasingly-severe
sentences, and collectively by enforcing oppressive police practices in the
segregated communities where most African-Americans lived.54 The War
on Drugs, with its emphasis on subjecting mass numbers of people to police search and seizure mostly because they live in a certain neighborhood
or have skin of a certain color, depended on police officers possessing the
capacity and authority to “sift[ ] through a large volume of citizens in order to discover criminal activity.”55 The Warren Court’s jurisprudence—
demanding clear justification for exercise of police authority, and reminding individuals of their rights to be protected from oppressive police
conduct—was simply not compatible with the tactics used in the War on
Drugs.56
The President’s anti-crime paranoia and War on Drugs rhetoric was,
not surprisingly, heavily reflected in the precedent of the men he appointed.57 Led by the new Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Supreme
Court began to take a markedly more deferential approach to policing
issues.58 The Court—comprised, with the exception of Justice Thurgood
Marshall, entirely of white men59—began to embrace a style of policing
dyn/content/article/2010/12/11/AR2010121102890.html [https://perma.cc/
RB5M-6QAV].
51. See MCMAHON, supra note 49, at 3–4, 36; Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 12, at 1889–90.
52. This agenda experienced a recent rebirth in the form of Donald Trump’s
presidential candidacy. Trump, who has a fondness for likening himself to Nixon,
shared Nixon’s popularity primarily among white voters, and eagerness to identify
himself as a “law-and-order candidate.” See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Alexander
Burns, It’s Donald Trump’s Convention. But the Inspiration? Nixon., N.Y. TIMES (July
18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/politics/donald-trump-portrayed-as-an-heir-to-richard-nixon.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/USK8-8VDF];
Christopher N. Lasch, Donald Trump’s Threat to Justice Reform, CRIME REP. (Dec. 15,
2015), http://thecrimereport.org/2015/12/15/2015-12-donald-trumps-threat-tojustice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/F4JL-AUTU]; Jules Witcover, Trump Channels
1968 Richard Nixon, BALT. SUN (July 25, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/politics/bs-ed-witcover-trump-20160725-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/V6Z7-A6XD].
53. See Cooper, supra note 46, at 852–53, 893.
54. See ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 30–35; Baum, supra note 50.
55. See Miller, supra note 41, at 215–16.
56. See id.
57. See Cooper, supra note 46, at 852–53.
58. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1889–90; Steiker, supra
note 47, at 2469–70.
59. See Compare Supreme Court Justices, INSIDE GOV., http://supreme-court-justices.insidegov.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2017); see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose
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that was both “dragnet and racialized,” with low percentages of success but
inevitably, given the huge number of people now subjected to stops and
searches, an occasional victory for police to tout.60 What eventually became a tidal wave of pro-police decisions started as a small ripple in 1968,
when the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio.61
In Terry, the Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether an experienced police officer behaved constitutionally when he stopped and
frisked three men who were standing on a street corner and “didn’t look
right” to the officer.62 Although the officer unquestionably did not have
probable cause to stop the men, the Court sanctioned the officer’s actions
by creating, for the first time, a “reasonable suspicion” test allowing an
officer to stop and frisk people as long as the officer has reasonable suspicion—a standard less than probable cause—that crime has occurred, is
occurring, or will soon occur.63 Although the Terry Court acknowledged
that the officer’s stop and frisk ran the risk of encouraging “wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority
groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain,” the Court nonetheless
approved of the officer’s conduct.64
If the goal of Terry was, as it had been in the past, to ensure that
individuals’ constitutional rights to freedom from intrusive police conduct
remained protected, the decision was a dismal failure.65 But that was
likely not the goal. In dissecting the Terry decision—which is hard to understand purely as a matter of constitutional theory because the Fourth
Amendment makes no reference to searches and seizures authorized by
mere reasonable suspicion——Professor Anthony Thompson has noted
that Terry is one of the first cases in which the Supreme Court chose the
narrative of “police officer as expert.”66 This narrative allowed the Court
Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. 837, 861–62 (2009) (providing statistical analysis of how factors such
as race, gender, cultural orientation, and income level can affect one’s perception
of whether police behaved appropriately in given situations, and criticizing Supreme Court for deferring to white majority perspective); Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination
Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1446, 1449 (2010) (criticizing the overwhelmingly white and male Supreme Court for “enhancing and privileging the dominant, majority perspective’s role” in cases that involve minority rights).
60. See Miller, supra note 41, at 220; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 12, at 1862–63 (“[A]s crime rates continued to climb and the country took a
more conservative turn after the Johnson years, proposals that legislatures place
additional constraints on policing largely fell on deaf ears.” (footnote omitted)).
61. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is That
Enough? The Irrationality of Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 94 (2007).
62. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–7.
63. See id. at 19–21; see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 852–53.
64. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 (footnote omitted).
65. See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS.
L.J. 423, 424 (2004).
66. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 971 (1999).
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to ignore other reasons the officer may have believed the men “didn’t look
right”—for example, that two of the men were black, and standing on a
street corner, which was a classic stereotype of the War on Drugs67—and
instead assume that the officer, buoyed by years of experience in law enforcement, possessed an expertise in sniffing out crime that ordinary citizens simply do not understand.68 Such an officer could be trusted to
make wise decisions based on mere suspicion, rather than probable cause.
The notion of police officers as experts to whom courts should defer,
rather than authorities courts should view with suspicion, became the
overwhelmingly dominant narrative in the decades following Terry.69 In a
ten-year period spanning from 1982 to 1991—while the War on Drugs
reached its climax, and the nation’s prison population increased at a rate
unparalleled in the modern world70—the Supreme Court heard thirty
narcotics cases involving questions of whether law enforcement acted illegally in stopping or searching someone (or something).71 In twenty-nine
of those thirty cases, the government had lost in the court below.72 The
Supreme Court sided with the government, and concluded that law enforcement officers’ actions were constitutional in all but three of the thirty
cases.73 The Court itself did not bother to hide its motivation for taking
67. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5; Katz, supra note 65, at 429.
68. See Thompson, supra note 66, at 971.
69. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1862–63; Harris, supra
note 15, at 666 (concluding that idea of deference to police officers “took center
stage during the 1980’s”).
70. See Associated Press, U.S. Has Highest Rate of Imprisonment in World, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/07/us/us-has-highestrate-of-imprisonment-in-world.html [https://perma.cc/7PFP-XFK7]; Tracy L.
Snell, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1991, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug.
1993), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/142729.pdf [https://perma.cc/48XPJD6H].
71. The thirty cases are: Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); Florida v.
Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.s’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States
v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S.
478 (1985); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); and United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
72. The one exception to this is Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
73. The only three cases in which the Court found law enforcement actions to
be unconstitutional were Wells, 495 U.S. at 3; Place, 462 U.S. at 700; and Royer, 460
U.S. at 497.
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these cases: in United States v. Sokolow,74 which addressed the legality of a
police officer’s stop of a suspected drug courier, the Court announced in
its decision that it granted certiorari “because of [the] serious implications
for the enforcement of the federal narcotics laws.”75 Similarly, in United
States v. Arvizu,76 the Court acknowledged that it granted certiorari “because of [the case’s] importance to the enforcement of federal drug and
immigration laws.”77 By the year 2000, the Court had affirmed law enforcement officers’ actions so consistently, in so many cases, that one federal appellate judge referred to the Fourth Amendment as “hors de combat
of the government’s so-called War on Drugs and its efforts to interdict
illegal immigration, which together have produced a kind of public hysteria that has in turn impeded rational judgment and logic.”78
In many of those cases the Court went out of its way not only to affirm
the legality of police officers’ conduct, but also to emphasize that those
officers’ actions must be viewed through the lens of deference. In United
States v. Cortez,79 for example, the Court was asked to decide whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop suspected illegal immigrants
crossing the border from Mexico into the United States.80 In affirming
the constitutionality of the officers’ stop, the Court emphasized that the
facts “must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”81
Similarly, in Illinois v. Lafayette,82 the Court rejected an argument that police officers had no right to search the bag of an arrestee prior to incarceration, and reasoned that it was “hardly in a position to second-guess police
departments” regarding the appropriate way to protect its employees.83
In Michigan Department of Police v. Sitz,84 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of roadside checkpoints by police officers, despite evidence that such checkpoints are both an intrusive and ineffective means
of finding and deterring criminals.85 The Court noted that, while reason74. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
75. See id. at 7.
76. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
77. See id. at 273 (citation omitted); see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 893.
78. See United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., dissenting).
79. 449 U.S. 411 (1981)
80. See id. at 412–13.
81. See id. at 418.
82. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
83. See id. at 648; see also Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a police officer who shot and killed a fleeing suspect acted reasonably, and echoing the Supreme Court’s deference to the judgments of officers: “we
must avoid substituting our personal notions of proper police procedure for the
instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex
world that policemen face every day.”).
84. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
85. See id. at 453–54.
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able people might disagree about the best way to apprehend drunk drivers, “the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the
governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources.”86 In Ornelas v. United States87—a case
addressing whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and
search the car of two men whom they suspected of drug trafficking—the
Court reiterated that police officers “view[ ] the facts through the lens of
[their] police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a
context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences
that deserve deference.”88 And in Arvizu, the Court found that a patrol
agent had reasonable suspicion to stop a man crossing the border, concluding that appellate courts must grant “due weight” to the inferences
the agent drew from the man’s behavior.89
The unifying force between the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, as Professor Sklansky has noted, is “significant latitude to
law enforcement.”90 Professor Robin Magee refers to this theory of police
expertise as “the good cop paradigm”—a “false myth of the police officer
as a law-abiding citizen who is chiefly, if not totally, motivated by law enforcement interests when appropriate and who can be trusted to behave
within constitutional parameters.”91 The good cop paradigm allows courts
to presume that law enforcement conduct was indeed constitutional, and
plausibly defer to the actions of police officers, even when no evidence
exists that they are employing best or even reasonable practices.92 To the
contrary, even if a police officer’s conduct is demonstrably not the least
86. See id.
87. 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
88. See id. at 699; see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 893 (noting that the Ornelas
Court’s broad grant of discretion to police officers “occurred in the context of
both media fomenting of a drug war and the reality that law enforcement relies on
its ability to utilize certain techniques to conduct the drug war” (footnote
omitted)).
89. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); see also United States
v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a claim that an officer’s stop
and arrest was unreasonable, and citing Arvizu for the proposition that the Supreme Court “accorded great deference to the officer’s knowledge of the nature
and the nuances of the type of criminal activity that he had observed in his experience, almost to the point of permitting it to be the focal point of the analysis”
(citation omitted)).
90. See Sklansky, supra note 15, at 298.
91. See Magee, supra note 11, at 160–61 (footnotes omitted); see also Kathryn
R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, Society, and the Fourth
Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623, 687 (1995) (noting that many courts “appear to trust that police officers perform such acts out of
concern for citizens rather than as a subterfuge seizure or search”).
92. See Magee, supra note 11, at 192; see also Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of
Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding jury did not “automatically
get to second-guess” decisions of police officers, “even though the plaintiff has an
expert and a plausible claim that the situation could better have been handled
differently”); Foley, supra note 46, at 275 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s extreme deference to police officers has “green-lighted . . . policing from the gut”).
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intrusive means of accomplishing a stated goal, the Court will rubberstamp it as long as the conduct could plausibly be considered reasonable.93 The motivation behind this paradigm, and the resulting latitude
toward police officers, is not evidence. Neither the Court, nor the governmental agencies advocating on behalf of the police officers in these cases,
have made much, if any, effort to prove that law enforcement practices
actually merit the Court’s assumptions regarding their expertise.94 Instead, the Court has at times admitted that its decisions are made with the
goal of making police officers’ jobs easier.95 In Hudson v. Michigan,96 the
Court—declining to apply the exclusionary rule even in the face of admitted police misconduct—acknowledged that the rule’s “costly toll upon . . .
law enforcement objectives” was a reason to narrow its enforcement.97
The Court’s insistence on deference has also blinded it to
racially-motivated behavior and outright bias. Many of the Fourth Amendment cases the Court decided in law enforcement’s favor involved minority defendants whose race or national origin was explicitly a factor that
police officers used in deeming them suspicious.98 Other times, race was
not mentioned but still implicit in the decision. In Whren v. United States,99
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a narcotics task force stopping
two black men who the officers suspected of involvement in “illegal drugdealing activity.”100 Although the officers had no probable cause or even
reasonable suspicion to connect the men to narcotics, the Supreme Court
held that their motivation for the stop was immaterial, because the men
93. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment requires only that the defendant officers chose a “reasonable”
method to end the threat that the plaintiff posed to the officers in a force situation, regardless of the availability of less intrusive alternatives); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985) (“A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which
the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But ‘[t]he fact that the
[search could] have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not, itself,
render the search unreasonable.’ ” (citation omitted)); see also Tanner v. San Juan
Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1115 (D.N.M. 2012) (“To avoid a ‘Monday morning quarterback’ approach, the Fourth Amendment does not require the
use of the least, or even a less, forceful or intrusive alternative to effect custody, so
long as the use of force is reasonable under Graham v Connor.” (citation omitted)).
94. See Herbert, supra note 9, at 148 (“As a matter of course, courts defer to
‘officer expertise’ in defining and evaluating police encounters with civilians. Save
for intermittent and perfunctory inquiry into an officer’s training, experience, and
assignment, courts require little proof that the officer is the proper recipient of
such deference . . . .”); Miller, supra note 41, at 214 (noting that the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence of police expertise is “pure detective fiction”).
95. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
96. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
97. See id. at 591 (internal quotation omitted).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1985); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975).
99. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
100. See id. at 809.
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had committed a traffic violation and could be pulled over for that reason.101 And in Illinois v. Wardlow,102 a black man on the west side of Chicago did nothing more than flee from officers when they approached him,
but the Court held that the officers acted constitutionally in stopping and
frisking him because the man was in a high-crime area, and thus, it was
reasonable of the officers to believe that he also could be a criminal.103
Although innocent people may flee from police officers, the Court decided it could not “reasonably demand scientific certainty from . . . law
enforcement officers where none exists.”104
C. The Current State of Deference
The Court’s veneration of police officers has not abated in recent
years, leading some scholars to refer to the Court’s current jurisprudence
in policing cases as “a posture of extreme deference . . . that is very difficult to explain as a matter of constitutional theory.”105 Several decisions
from the last three years alone illustrate this point. In Plumhoff v. Rickard,106 decided in 2014, the Court held that police officers who shot and
killed a fleeing suspect who had been pulled over for a damaged headlight
acted reasonably, and reiterated that any review of a police officer’s decision-making must “allo[w] for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is nec101. See id. at 810–13; see also Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America
Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United
States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010)
(criticizing Whren decision for allowing racial profiling by law enforcement to go
“largely unchecked”); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843,
1853–61 (2004) (critiquing Whren).
102. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
103. See id. at 121–22, 125–26.
104. See id. at 125; see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 884–85 (2002) (opining
that Court’s insistent deference to police officers allows officers to racially profile
suspects); Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person
Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 357–58
(2001) (arguing that Court in Wardlow articulated a reasonable standard “too deferential to police officers’ perceptions of reasonableness,” and that “[i]n our criminal justice system, reasonable behavior is defined as White behavior”).
105. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1890 (footnote omitted); see also Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 994 (2014) (calling out
the Supreme Court for “uncritically tolerating [the] indignities” of granting police
officers unbridled discretion to arrest for minor incidents such as traffic offenses,
jumping turnstiles, stealing food to eat, and possessing minor amounts of marijuana); Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1119,
1127 (2008) (labeling the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding use of force
by police officers as “deeply impoverished . . . unprincipled, indeterminate, and
sometimes simply misleading.”).
106. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
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essary in a particular situation.”107 In 2015, the Court granted qualified
immunity to police officers who fired numerous shots at a mentally disabled woman, concluding that although the officers may have made “some
mistakes,” their conduct should not be judged with the benefit of
hindsight.108
Later that same year, the Court granted qualified immunity to another police officer who shot and killed a motorist during a high-speed
chase.109 Although the officer had never received training in shooting at
vehicles to disable them, and his superior specifically ordered him to
“stand by” and not shoot, the Supreme Court found that no reasonable
jury could conclude that the officer used an amount of force that violated
clearly established law when he ignored his supervisor’s commands and
fired six shots into the driver’s car.110 In so doing, the Court noted that,
“whatever can be said of the wisdom of” the officer’s decision, he could
not be held civilly liable for his conduct.111 Most recently, in Utah v.
Strieff,112 a majority of the Court declined to exclude evidence recovered
by a detective during an unquestionably illegal stop, because the man who
the detective illegally stopped had, unknown to the officer, an unrelated
warrant out for his arrest.113 Although the detective had no valid reason
to suspect the man of illegal activity, and stopped him only because the
man had walked out of a house the detective thought might be involved in
“drug activity,” the Court found that the detective’s conduct was “at most
negligent,” and any mistakes in the stop were made in good faith.114 Jus107. See id. at 2020 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97
(1989)).
108. See City and Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775, 1778 (2015).
Qualified immunity is a topic that many scholars have covered in more depth than
I can devote in this Article. See, e,g., Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting
“All But the Plainly Incompetent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1023 (2012); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 919 (2015); Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures
and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889
(2015); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
For purposes of this piece, I note that qualified immunity is a common means by
which the judicial system defers to the decision-making of police officers and is an
easy way for the court to consistently opt out of holding officers responsible for
potential misconduct. See Chen, supra, at 910 (noting that current state of qualified immunity doctrine “rapidly approaches the status of absolute immunity” for
police officers); Schwartz, supra, at 937 (explaining the results of an empirical
study which showed that police officers are “virtually always” indemnified in lawsuits alleging their misconduct).
109. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015).
110. See id. at 307, 312; see also Kahan et al., supra note 59, at 841 (arguing that
the Court has a wrongheaded tendency to “privilege its own view” of whether law
enforcement conduct is legal, without considering—or even acknowledging—alternative viewpoints).
111. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 311.
112. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
113. See id. at 2060, 2064.
114. See id. at 2062–63.
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tice Sonia Sotomayor issued a lonely but scathing dissent, arguing that the
officer uncovered evidence of the warrant only by “exploiting his own illegal conduct.”115
In recent years scholars have, with increasing solidarity, condemned
the Supreme Court’s knee-jerk deference to police conduct.116 They have
excoriated the Court for “repeatedly defer[ring] to the judgments of all
officers”;117 “strongly defer[ring] to the judgment of police officers” without seriously questioning their use of force;118 applying an “increasingly
deferential review” of officers’ decisions;119 interpreting the Constitution
so as to grant “extraordinary discretion to police”;120 accepting police officers’ explanations of their conduct “blindly and without question”;121
and applying a “presumption[ ] of legitimate government action,” rather
than closely examining the high cost of police abuse.122 The Court’s deference consistently comes at the greatest cost to people of color.123 And it
conflicts distinctly with the country’s historic mistrust of expansive police
powers.124
The Court’s decisions expose its reluctance to keep law enforcement
authorities in check, in the name of fighting crime and protecting the
country’s borders. But these decisions also reveal a reason white Americans are so often oblivious to policing abuses: they were never the intended targets of these abuses. From the nascent moments of the drug
war, people of color have been both intentionally targeted and disproportionately prosecuted.125 The Court’s deference allows police to target racial minorities, and thus, many white people remain either naı̈ve or
intentionally blind to those abuses.

115. See id. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 105, at 994; Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 12, at 1889–90; Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause
Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 790 (2013); Greene, supra note 15, at 36; L.
Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1155
(2012).
117. See Richardson, supra note 116, at 1155.
118. See Urbonya, supra note 91, at 627.
119. Goldberg, supra note 116, at 802.
120. Butler, supra note 15, at 247.
121. Herbert, supra note 9, at 148.
122. See Greene, supra note 15, at 36.
123. See Butler, supra note 15, at 252 (observing that people in high crime
areas, who are most frequently minorities, suffer the most from the Court’s deference to police); Sklansky, supra note 15, at 273 (noting that the Court’s decisions
disregard “the distinctive grievances and concerns of minorit[ies]”).
124. See Urbonya, supra note 91, at 705; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko,
supra note 12, at 1830–31 (noting that police departments are some of the “least
regulated” agencies in America).
125. See ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 58–59.
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MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS

Although a number of scholars have bemoaned the way the judiciary
reviews allegations of police misconduct that arise in criminal cases or civil
lawsuits,126 very few have discussed how that same deeply-ingrained deference pervades administrative review of police misconduct claims. Administrative review occurs—or, at least, is supposed to occur—when a civilian
complains about misconduct by a particular police officer or officers
within a department. Depending on the city, the civilian may be able to
raise that complaint in person at a police department, via a formal written
complaint, over the telephone, or online.127 The complaint is then reviewed by, depending on the review process instituted in the particular city
or police department, either an internal unit within the police department
itself, or an external review agency.128
Part II of this Article addresses the manner in which the deference so
prevalent in judicial review of police officers’ conduct—discussed in Part
I—also permeates administrative review of civilian complaints regarding
police misconduct. In theory, a complaint of police misconduct that is
investigated and found to be true should result in some sort of meaningful
action against the police officer. In reality, the review process is so imbued
from start to finish with systemic deference to police officers and departments that complaints are rarely sustained, and even less likely to result in
consequences for the officers involved.
A. Police Departments Are Frequently Entrusted with the Responsibility to
Investigate Complaints of Their Own Misconduct
Internal review is the practice of relying on police officers—typically
working in a unit known as internal affairs—to handle investigations into
alleged misconduct by other officers within the same department.129 For
most police departments across the United States, internal affairs units
126. See supra Part I(C).
127. See, e.g., File a Complaint, CHI. CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.chicagocopa.org/complaints/ [https://perma.cc/LXV9-Z4HE] (last
visited July 14, 2016); File a Complaint Online, N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV.
BOARD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/complaints/file-online.page [https://per
ma.cc/GY4H-KGVQ] (last visited July 14, 2016).
128. See Moran, supra note 17, at 853–82.
129. For readers unfamiliar with the internal affairs review process and how it
may operate, I recommend two works, see OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE, http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p164-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6SG-272E] (last visited Mar. 22,
2017) (providing guidelines for what should happen when civilian files a complaint with an internal affairs unit); Ryan J. Reilly, Here’s What Happens When You
Complain to Cops About Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/internal-affairs-police-misconduct_us_5613ea2fe4b022a4
ce5f87ce [https://perma.cc/3G6X-3TRW] (discussing what actually does happen
when a citizen tries to file a complaint with an internal affairs unit).
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review the majority of civilian complaints regarding officer misconduct.130
This means that when a civilian complains about misconduct by an officer
within a police department, another officer in that same department both
receives and investigates the complaint.
This model of internal review affords police departments a “high degree of autonomy” in deciding how to regulate their officers.131 The Supreme Court has—not surprisingly, given the level of deference it
routinely affords police officers and departments132—spoken out in favor
of this approach. In Hudson, the Court concluded, as a basis for declining
to apply the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations, that police departments are increasingly equipped to teach their own “how to
craft an effective regime for internal discipline.”133 Accordingly, external
pressures are, in the Court’s view, no longer necessary.134 The Court cited
little evidentiary support for its conclusion that police departments are
effective at disciplining their own.135 Instead—after admitting that its earlier precedent in Mapp v. Ohio136 had suggested a far “wide[r] scope for
the exclusionary rule”137—the Court noted the “substantial social costs” of
applying the exclusionary rule and chose to rely on law enforcement to
police themselves instead.138
B. Even “Independent” Review Agencies Are Often Comprised of Current
or Ex-Law Enforcement Officials
The alternative to internal review is some form of external, independent review agency. Independent review agencies are not a new creation:
they first reached a limited level of prominence during the Civil Rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s, after activists from African-American
130. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT USE OF FORCE 4 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6VG-58XR]; see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1998), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/
uspo25.htm (“Internal affairs divisions are at the center of any examination of how
police departments deal with human rights abuses committed by officers.”).
131. See Merrick Bobb, Internal and External Police Oversight in the United States,
NAT’L PREA RES. CTR. https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/ files/
library/internalandexternalpoliceoversightintheunitedstates.pdf [https://perma
.cc/L3MM-CXSX] (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
132. See supra Part I(B)–(C).
133. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
134. See id.; see also Miller, supra note 41, at 219 (“Compounding its deference
to authoritarian policing, the Court currently emphasizes that self-regulation
rather than external, judicial scrutiny or citizen review is sufficient to ensure police
compliance with fourth amendment norms.” (footnote omitted)).
135. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599 (citing several handbooks for the proposition
that police departments generally have more established internal discipline procedures than they did several decades ago).
136. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
137. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (citing Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655).
138. See id. at 594, 596, 599.
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communities began to insist that outside agencies investigate the blatant
abuses police officers were inflicting on black communities.139 The core
premise of independent review is that, because internal affairs review is
subject to bias, some entity other than the police department in which the
accused officer works should be responsible for reviewing complaints alleging police misconduct.140
Although the primary purpose of these agencies is to provide a review
system free from the bias that permeates internal affairs units, in reality,
many of the agencies are staffed primarily—or even exclusively—by former police officers. The state of South Carolina relies on the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division—a supposedly independent agency
comprised entirely of law enforcement officers—to investigate possible
misconduct in all officer-involved shootings across the state.141 Although
supporters of the agency claim that its independence serves as a “boon to
its integrity” when investigating these shootings, substantial evidence exists
to show that the agency routinely justifies officer-involved shootings, even
when police officers are proven to have lied about the incident in which
they were involved.142
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority was also, as recently
as 2014, staffed entirely by former law enforcement officials.143 The
agency recently came under fire for hiring a psychologist, best-known for
his staunch defense of police officers who shoot civilians, to train its investigators.144 One of the investigators was quoted as saying that the psychologist’s training gave him “a better way to articulate why the [police]
shootings are almost always justified.”145 “The former chief of the Independent Police Review Authority” “also fired one of the agency’s investigators,” a black man who “had determined that several Chicago police
shootings were unjustified and refused agency pressure to change his find139. See Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
479, 498–99 (2009). See generally Moran, supra note 17.
140. See, e.g., Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 593 (1997). For a more
thorough discussion about the varieties of independent review agencies, see generally, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT (2001); Samuel Walker, Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN
OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 11 (Justina Cintrón Perino ed., 2006).
141. See Balko, supra note 9.
142. See id.
143. See generally POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM: RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES
THEY SERVE (Apr. 2016), https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM4W-Q6EJ] [hereinafter
CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE].
144. See, e.g., Chip Mitchell, City Sends Police-Shooting Investigators to Trainer Accused of Pro-Cop Bias, WBEZ NEWS (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.wbez.org/shows/
wbez-news/city-sends-policeshooting-investigators-to-trainer-accused-of-procopbias/60dabb6f-bae7-4aea-a952-e4f59ba3a156 [https://perma.cc/5TSB-GUEC].
145. See id.
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ings.”146 Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force recently concluded
that the Independent Police Review Authority is “badly broken” and had
“lost the trust of the community” by hiring and staffing the agency almost
exclusively with ex-law enforcement personnel.147
C. Police Departments Are Rarely Required to Use Early Intervention Systems
That Could Protect Citizens Against Misconduct Before It Occurs
By the time a civilian files a complaint against a police officer, that
civilian has already been (or at least believes herself to have been) aggrieved. In many police departments, a small “minority of officers account
for a disproportionate” percentage of misconduct.148 The best way to protect civilians from police misconduct is to proactively identify those officers and correct their misconduct, or if that fails, remove them from the
force. That is exactly what early intervention systems are designed to do.
Early intervention systems are “a data-based management tool [intended]
to identify” and intervene with potential problem officers.149 The systems,
which typically take the form of software allowing authorized users to track
data about any given officer, can identify these officers early in their career
and allow police departments—and review agencies—to pay closer attention to these officers.150 Early intervention systems record a variety of information about police officers, including civilian complaints, stops,
arrests, shootings, documented uses of force, and lawsuits filed against the
officers.151 When an officer reaches a department-prescribed threshold
number of triggering incidents (for example, more than two civilian complaints against him), the officer’s file should then be automatically reviewed to assess whether intervention is necessary. Possible interventions
146. Moran, supra note 17, at 872–73; Chip Mitchell, City Fires Investigator Who
Found Cops at Fault in Shooting, WBEZ NEWS (July 20, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/
news/city-fires-investigator-who-found-cops-fault-shootings-112423 [https://perma
.cc/9LFA-3HZV].
147. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 14,
42.
148. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/
16/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA63-PLNV]; see also SAMUEL
WALKER,U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE 45–48 (2003), http://www
.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/inaction1/pubs/EarlyInterventionSystemsLawEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CE9-PRZ8].
149. See WALKER, supra note 148, at 3.
150. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 2, 16 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/
07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XJD-WLLX].
151. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROMOTING COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RACIAL PROFILING 7–8 (2008), http://riczai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p146-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA7S-UT8D]
(discussing the procedures and potential benefits of early intervention for new
police officers).
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include additional training, counseling, or discipline.152 At some point, if
the problem behavior continues, the officer should be fired. Although
early intervention systems have been in existence for more than fifteen
years, and are recommended as a “best practice” for police departments,
police departments are rarely held accountable for utilizing those systems
effectively.153 The Department of Justice has warned that implementation
of early intervention systems is a “major issue” for police departments.154
And failure to implement can have major results. Albuquerque, for example, had an early intervention system for years, but it tracked only limited
types of misconduct and had impossibly high thresholds for the number of
warnings an officer could incur before triggering intervention.155
When Albuquerque police officer Sean Wallace shot and killed
an unarmed man in 2011, the public learned only after the [killing] that this was [the third time Wallace had shot] an unarmed
civilian. Wallace had killed his first victim in 2004, and wounded
another in 2010, but received no discipline for either of these
prior incidents.156
The final report from Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force, released
in 2016, also had scathing criticism for the Chicago Police Department’s
non-use of its early intervention system.157 The report noted that, although Chicago’s early intervention system was a “potentially-invaluable
tool” for monitoring and intervening with problem officers, the system was
“not working.”158 In 2013, the Chicago Police Department had zero officers enrolled in either of its two early intervention programs, and in
2015, only thirteen officers were enrolled.159 One officer famously not
enrolled in earlier versions of the program was Jerome Finnigan, a Chicago police veteran who, between 2000 and 2008, received 89 misconduct
complaints ranging from theft to illegal searches to felony crimes.160 The
Chicago Police Department made no effort to enroll him in its formal
intervention program, and Finnigan was eventually indicted on felony
152. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1053 (2010).
153. See WALKER, supra note 148, at 54.
154. See id. at 55.
155. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE ALBUQUERQUE POLICE
DEPARTMENT 29 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/
2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHM5-GPBD].
156. Moran, supra note 17, at 895 (footnote omitted); see also INVESTIGATION
OF THE ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 155, at 12; Astrid Galvan,
Shooting Was Police Officer’s Third, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 12, 2011), http://www
.abqjournal.com/news/metro/122256556202newsmetro05-12-11.htm [https://
perma.cc/N2LF-X7PB].
157. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 15.
158. See id. at 103.
159. See id. at 15.
160. See id. at 96–97.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 4

976

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 953

charges of home invasion, kidnapping, and murder.161 The Task Force
report concluded that the police department’s supervisors, the Board of
Internal Affairs, and the Independent Police Review Authority had collectively “not engaged in efforts to identify officers whose records suggest
repeated instances of misconduct or bias.”162 Refusing to identify, intervene with, or discipline officers who have been the subject of repeated
complaints is a form of deference because it assumes without investigation
that, despite these allegations, the officer is still fit to work.
D. Police Officers Are Provided Deferential Protections Throughout the
Complaint Investigation Process
When an allegation of police misconduct arises, the agency charged
with reviewing that allegation—whether it be an independent review
agency or an internal affairs unit—should attempt to obtain as much information as possible about the incident from both the officers involved
and the department itself. However, due largely to collective bargaining
agreements between cities and police unions, police officers in many departments are treated with kid gloves throughout the investigation.163 Police unions became a prominent feature of American policing during the
1960s, in direct response to a growing civil rights movement that criticized
police abuses—particularly against minorities—and increasingly called for
civilian review of police departments.164 The unions have, in many cities,
led the charge for collective bargaining agreements and law enforcement
officer bills of rights that treat officers far more deferentially than civilian
witnesses or suspects, allow them to refuse to participate in misconduct
investigations, and even permit departments to conceal or destroy evidence of misconduct.165 One of the most controversial protections that
many jurisdictions provide to police officers, but not civilian witnesses, is
the requirement of waiting periods before an officer can be questioned
about possible misconduct.166 Maryland’s Law Enforcement Officer Bill
161. See id. at 97.
162. See id. at 73.
163. See, e.g., Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 196 (2005); Kyle Christopher Veatch, The Effect of Collective Bargaining on the Use of Innovative Police Policy, OSPREY J. IDEAS & INQUIRY (2008), http:/
/digitalcommons.unf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=ojii_vol
umes [https://perma.cc/KPU3-5793]; Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts
Shield Police Departments from DOJ Reforms, IN THESE TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://in
thesetimes.com/features/police-killings-union-contracts.html [https://perma.cc/
9T84-FT7G].
164. See Keenan & Walker, supra note 163, at 196.
165. See id. at 190; see also Ari Paul, As New York City Considers Criminal Justice
Reforms, Police Unions Stand in the Way, IN THESE TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://in
thesetimes.com/working/entry/17399/as_de_blasio_pursues_criminal_justice_re
forms_one_group_stands_in_the_way_p [https://perma.cc/4VDT-7FRH].
166. See Keenan & Walker, supra note 163, at 213; see also, e.g., Uriel J. Garcia,
Experts Debate 4-day Delay to Interview Officers in Teen’s Shooting, SANTA FE NEW MEXI-
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of Rights prohibits an officer suspected of misconduct from being interviewed by anyone other than another police officer, so a civilian review
board cannot interview the officer at all.167 But even when a police department attempts an interview, Maryland provides any officer subjected
to questioning a waiting period of up to ten days, ostensibly to obtain
counsel before questioning.168 Other states and cities provide forty-eight
hours,169 and still other agreements require that all question be suspended for an unspecified or “reasonable” period of time until the officer
can obtain counsel.170
The so-called “48-hour rule” has achieved such notoriety that it was
even featured in a 2016 British television drama, Line of Duty.171 The
show, which depicts a fictional internal affairs unit assigned to investigate
corrupt officers, opens with a police officer shooting and killing a man
attempting to surrender, and then instructing his squad to fabricate the
crime scene to cover up the murder.172 When the commander arrives on
the scene in response to the shooting, he informs the officers involved in
the incident that they have 48 hours of “recovery time” before being interviewed, and tells the team, “My advice is to use those 48 hours wisely.”173
The officers then collude to cover up the crime and provide false stateCAN (June 18, 2014), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/experts-debate—day-delay-to-interview-officers-in-teen/article_b160f0be-0d63-5890b051-27a4dd735ca8.html [https://perma.cc/5VJW-96E6] (discussing controversy
over Santa Fe police officer who was not interviewed until four days after he shot
and killed sixteen-year-old Hispanic boy); Jaeah Lee, Why Cops Are Told to Keep Quiet
After a Shooting, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2015/08/why-do-police-departments-delay-interviewing-officers-involvedshootings [https://perma.cc/7FUX-YSGF] (discussing various rules police departments across the country have that mandate waiting period between an event involving possible officer misconduct, and interviews of the officers involved, and
arguing that those rules serve primarily to protect officers and allow them time to
fabricate stories); Amy Waldman, Police Accord Would Drop “48-Hour Rule”, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/15/nyregion/police-accord-would-drop-48-hour-rule.html [https://perma.cc/T5KC-CL4L] (reporting
push by New York City mayor to drop mandated 48-hour delay before interviewing
police officers involved in possible misconduct).
167. See MD. CODE § 3–104(b) (2015); Keenan & Walker, supra note 163, at
189.
168. See MD. CODE § 3–104(j)(1)–(2).
169. See KY. REV. STAT. § 15.520(5)(c) (2015); Emmanuel, supra note 163;
John Sepulvado, Police Oversight Board Wants Portland’s “48 Hour” Rule to End, OPB
(May 16, 2016), http://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-portland-48-hour-rulepolice-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/HL29-ZGCY]; see also Eleanor Heard, Are the
New York Police Officers Safely Playing or Playing it Safe? Eliminating the Forty-Eight Hour
Rule, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 133, 136 (2000).
170. See DEL. CODE TIT. 11, § 9200(c)(9) (2014); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 725/3.9
(2016); MINN. STAT. § 626.89(9) (2012); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28.6-2(9) (2016);
Keenan & Walker, supra note 163, at 212.
171. Line of Duty: Explanations (BBC Two television broadcast Mar. 24, 2016).
172. See id. at 0:00–7:00.
173. See id. at 7:18–33; see also id. at 25:15–33 (showing investigators noting
that the officers involved had “48 hours to get their stories straight”).
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ments to investigators. In Chicago, reality mirrors this fiction: after police
officer Jason Van Dyke shot and killed seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald, numerous officers who witnessed the shooting provided false statements claiming that McDonald was aggressively moving toward the officers
when Van Dyke shot him—assertions that video of the incident refutes.174
The Police Accountability Task Force concluded the City’s collective bargaining agreements with the police department, notably including the
waiting period before speaking with investigators, had “essentially turned
the code of silence into official policy.”175 Even after an officer is interviewed, some collective bargaining agreements allow officers to revise
their statements if confronted with evidence that their initial statements
were false. Chicago’s collective bargaining agreement provides that, when
the investigating agency possesses video or audio evidence of a misconduct
incident, an officer cannot be charged with making a false statement unless the officer is first given the opportunity to review the evidence, and
subsequently given an opportunity to clarify or amend his statement if desired.176 Collective bargaining agreements also hamper investigations by
requiring destruction of past civilian complaint records. A recent review
of sixty police department contracts revealed that more than one-third
contained provisions allowing or even requiring police departments and
review agencies to destroy civilian complaint records after a period of
years.177 Other provisions prohibit investigators from investigating complaints older than five years.178 These kinds of agreements protect officers

174. See Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ from Video in Death of Laquan
McDonald, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/us/
officers-statements-differ-from-video-in-death-of-laquan-mcdonald.html?mcubz=3
[https://perma.cc/Q5HE-AXQF]; Warning, Graphic Content: Laquan McDonald
Shooting Dash-Cam Video, supra note 5; see also Eddie Randle, Officer Comments After
Muskogee Pepper Spray Incident Spark Controversy, FOX23.COM (Sept. 7, 2016), http://
www.fox23.com/news/officer-comments-after-muskogee-pepper-spray-incidentspark-controversy/438186969 [https://perma.cc/68GL-4H5V] (video showing
Muskogee, Oklahoma, police officers discussing among themselves how to “spin”
incident in which they pepper-sprayed eighty four-year-old woman); ACLUvideos,
Police Record Themselves Conspiring to Retaliate Against Protester, YOUTUBE (Sep. 19,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvyehgt9CuA [https://perma.cc/
W8HX-6EF8] (recording of Connecticut police officers apparently conspiring to
falsify charges against a protester); Sarah Larimer, Video of Paul O’Neal Shooting
Shows Officers Firing at a Fleeing Car, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/08/05/video-of-paul-oneal-shootingshows-officers-firing-at-a-fleeing-car/?utm_term=.996cbad15f33 [https://perma
.cc/4CCA-VDXU] (showing video of Chicago police shooting of eighteen-year-old
Paul O’Neal, including police officers after the fact complaining that they would
be placed on desk duty, and suggesting that they say “he shot at us, right?”).
175. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 14,
71.
176. See id. at 71.
177. See Emmanuel, supra note 163.
178. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 72.
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who are serial offenders from being exposed by shrouding their past in
secrecy.179
E. Reviewing Bodies Are Reluctant to Sustain Misconduct Complaints
The rate at which reviewing bodies sustain misconduct complaints,
and the standards they employ to measure those complaints, is evidence of
the “presumption of rectitude”—a telltale sign of deference180—accompanying police officers’ actions and decisions. The Cleveland Internal Affairs Unit will sustain a complaint against an officer only if the allegations
are proven beyond a reasonable doubt—the highest standard in American
law, and one almost entirely absent from administrative review.181 When
the Department of Justice interviewed officers within Cleveland’s Internal
Affairs Unit, several admitted that their primary goal in investigations was
to absolve the accused officers wherever possible.182 In San Jose, California, the police department requires complainants who allege that an officer is racially biased to prove that the officer’s actions were in fact
motivated by racial bias, and if the complainants are unable to do so, the
department will defer to the officers’ version of events.183 As of 2014, the
San Jose Police Department had never once sustained a complaint of racially-biased policing.184 Baltimore police officers, meanwhile, “discourage complaints from being filed, misclassify complaints to minimize their
apparent severity, and conduct little or no investigation” into civilian complaints.185 Although Baltimore’s Internal Affairs unit has received more
than sixty complaints of illegal strip-searches in the past six years, it has
sustained only one, and closed many investigations without even interviewing the complainant.186 Statistically, the percentage of civilian complaints
sustained by either internal affairs units or independent review agencies is
consistently and perniciously low. The Newark, New Jersey Police Department’s Internal Affairs Unit “sustained between four to seven percent of
civilian complaints in the years spanning 2010 through 2012.”187 “Al179. See Emmanuel, supra note 163; see also CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 14.
180. See Magee, supra note 11, at 173.
181. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF
POLICE 5, 35 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WY2F-844D].
182. See id. at 5.
183. See OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, CITY OF SAN JOSE, 2014 IPA
YEAR END REPORT (2014), http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/
42029 [https://perma.cc/2SRG-G3KD].
184. See id. at 49.
185. See INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 10, at 10.
186. See id. at 33–34.
187. See Moran, supra note 17, at 860; INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT, supra note 150, at 35.
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though the unit was aware” of a “serious theft problem” within the police
department, having received numerous complaints from arrestees about
the same officers stealing their property during the arrest or booking process, it did not “sustain a single theft complaint against these officers.”188
Use of force complaints fared similarly: “over a five-year span, the Newark,
New Jersey, Police Department did not discipline a single officer for using
excessive force.”189 In a lawsuit filed against the City of Newark, an expert
concluded that the department had a pattern of favoring the officers and
“almost invariably reject[ing]” civilian complaints.190 Similarly, after the
Connecticut Attorney General’s office reviewed the Connecticut State Police internal affairs system, it reported that the review process was “so ineffective,” and the agency’s predilection to justify officer misconduct was “so
strong,” that officers were almost certain to avoid consequences for even
criminal behavior.191 Between 2001 and 2007, the Camden, New Jersey
Police Department received 485 complaints regarding excessive force, and
the Internal Affairs Unit sustained only two.192 A report on the Portland,
Oregon Police Department found that the Internal Affairs Division sustained “very few” civilian complaints of any sort, and filing complaints was
essentially futile because the department would simply not discipline
them.193 The nation’s largest police departments appear to be just as inclined to favor police officers over civilians. In Chicago, over a four-year
period stretching from 2011 to 2015, review agencies sustained only 7% of
civilian complaints.194 Of 400 shootings by police officers between 2007
and 2014, the Independent Police Review Authority found less than 1% to
be unjustified.195 Forty percent of complaints lodged against police officers were never even investigated during that four-year period, and another 37% were closed as “not sustained,” which means the investigators
reached no conclusion as to whether the complaint was valid.196 The
same was true in New York: in 2014, New York City’s Citizen Complaint
Review Board closed out nearly half of its cases with a finding of “unsubstantiated,” which means that the Board did not determine whether the
188. See Moran, supra note 17, at 860; INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT, supra note 150, at 31.
189. See Moran, supra note 17, at 863; INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT, supra note 150, at 42.
190. See Garcia v. City of Newark, No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616, at *4
(D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011).
191. See N.Y STATE POLICE & CONN. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT ON
THE EVALUATION OF THE CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INTERNAL
AFFAIRS PROGRAM ii, 132 (2006), www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/other/conn_report_12-0406.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV9N-2L8Z].
192. See Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217–18 (D.N.J. 2015).
193. See EILEEN LUNA-FIREBAUGH, PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT
POLICE REVIEW DIVISION 63 (2008), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ipr/article/
245276 [https://perma.cc/2ZRT-QPZN].
194. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 10.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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complaint had merit or not.197 In Baltimore, the police department recorded 2,818 uses of force by police officers over a six-year period, investigated only ten of those incidents, and identified only one as involving
excessive force.198
F. Reviewing Bodies Are Even More Reluctant to Impose Meaningful Discipline
In keeping with a fundamental concept of deference—reluctance to
substitute one’s own judgment for that of the police officer199—many internal affairs units and review boards are reluctant, even when an officer
has committed obvious misconduct, to impose any significant consequences. When the Department of Justice investigated the Ferguson Police Department in light of Michael Brown’s shooting death at the hands
of officer Darren Wilson, it discovered that Ferguson police officers routinely sent racially discriminatory emails to each other, stereotyping minorities as lazy, unemployed, living off welfare, and prone to committing
crimes.200 Not one of the officers receiving these emails ever reported
them as inappropriate, and none were disciplined for sending them.201
The Seattle Police Department has also had a number of incidents in
which police officers used racial slurs against minorities, including one in
which an officer was recorded threatening to “beat the f’ing Mexican piss
out of a suspect.”202 Although multiple officers at the scene witnessed this
incident, none reported it, and the police department did not discipline
the officer until a civilian bystander publicized a video of the incident.203
On other occasions, Seattle police officers called a Native American man a
“f’ing Indian,” and commented that a black man who worked at a hospital
must be “the janitor.”204 Despite complaints by civilians who overheard
the incidents, the police department declined to discipline these officers.205 When Chicago’s Independent Review Authority found that multiple police officers had used “racially biased language” with civilians, the
Review Authority recommended minor suspensions of no more than a few
197. See N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014-annual-report-rev2layout
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CDX-PLM2].
198. See INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 10, at 9.
199. See Horwitz, supra note 19, at 1061; Solove, supra note 18, at 946.
200. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 71–72 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZNT-L63X].
201. See id.
202. See INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 148, at
27.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 28.
205. See id.
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days for each officer.206 Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority
also has a long practice of allowing officers to accept minor discipline on a
lesser charge in order to forestall thorough investigation of a complaint.207 In 2015, for example, officers agreed to accept the Police Review Authority’s findings in cases where officers slapped and punched
their victims; struck a woman in the head while she was handcuffed and on
her knees; struck a victim’s head against concrete and then failed to provide medical assistance; strip-searched a minor without justification; and
fractured a girlfriend’s nose.208 In exchange, these cases were closed without complete investigation, despite the fact that some or all of these cases
may have involved criminal behavior by the officers.209 Even when the
Police Review Authority recommends discipline, it is rarely imposed: in
2015, 73% of the time that discipline was recommended, it was reduced
after arbitration.210 In the very rare cases when termination is recommended, the Police Board more frequently than not reverses that decision.211 Between 2011 and 2015, the Police Board upheld discharge
recommendations in only 41% of the cases it reviewed.212
G. Police Departments and Reviewing Agencies Are Allowed to Withhold Data
from the Public About Misconduct Complaints
Police officers and departments are afforded deference even after
complaints against them are resolved. Many states, as well as some cities,
prevent disclosure of disciplinary records or complaints filed against police officers except in rare circumstances.213 A 2013 investigation by News206. See CITY OF CHI. INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTH. QUARTERLY REPORT (July 15,
2015), http://www.iprachicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2015-0715QuarterlyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/28SS-BPX8]. The report does not provide any specific descriptions of the racially offensive language that the officers
used. See id.
207. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at
77–78.
208. See id. at 78.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 85.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 86.
213. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS Art. 5 § 50-a (2014) (preventing disclosure of
police records except by court order); AURORA, COLO., MUN. CODE § 50-41 (2005)
(placing strict limitations on disclosure of police records even when deemed relevant to criminal proceedings); Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288,
295 (Cal. 2006) (holding police personnel records are confidential under state
law); Md. Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell, 117 A.3d 1, 17–18 (Md. 2015) (holding
internal affairs investigatory records are exempt from disclosure); see also Jonathan
Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle
Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 762 (2015) (discussing how various state and city laws hamper disclosure of police personnel records in criminal
cases); David Packman, Police Misconduct Disclosure Laws, CATO INST. (Feb. 7, 2010),
http://www.policemisconduct.net/police-misconduct-disclosure-laws/ [https://
perma.cc/W4G9-2CGH] (summarizing police misconduct disclosure laws in all
fifty states).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss5/4

30

Moran: In Police We Trust

2017]

IN POLICE WE TRUST

983

day magazine revealed hundreds of Long Island police officers who had
been investigated for serious disciplinary issues and crimes, including having “shot innocent people, falsified official reports, manipulated DWI arrests to increase overtime pay and lied to district attorneys and
investigators.”214 The vast majority of these officers were allowed to stay
on the police force, and information about their misconduct was not disclosed to the public, in part because of a New York law that prevents disclosure of police records except by court order.215 In Baltimore—a city
that has endured more than its share of public dissatisfaction with the police in recent years—a former county attorney called on the city to forego
its “destructive obsession with maintaining the secrecy of police disciplinary records and proceedings,” which had contributed to eroding the
public’s trust in the police department.216 Review agencies have also been
historically reluctant to release information about their review processes
or resolutions. In New York, the Civilian Complaint Review Board has
been sued for refusing to release information about misconduct complaints sustained against Daniel Pantaleo, the New York police officer who
choked Eric Garner to death.217 Chicago’s Independent Police Review
Authority was also recently criticized for its lack of transparency in providing data about its complaint resolution process.218 The Review Authority
has not published an annual report since 2012, and provides only brief
summaries, without any identifying details, of sustained complaints against
officers.219 It also provides no means by which a member of the public
can track a complaint through to its resolution.220 The legal system’s
shift, from one originally suspicious of law enforcement abuses to one all
too ready to assume that law enforcement officials are acting appropriately, is apparent from start to finish in the review of police misconduct
claims. The legal system’s embrace of deference to police officers has, as
discussed in Part III below, had devastating effects in many communities,
particularly those comprised primarily of people of color.

214. See Sandra Peddie & Adam Playford, For Their Eyes Only, NEWSDAY (Dec.
18, 2013), http://data.newsday.com/crime/police-misconduct/ [https://perma
.cc/J83Q-ZA5X].
215. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS Art. 5 § 50-a; Peddie & Playford, supra note 216.
216. David A. Plymyer, Shining a Light on Police Misconduct, BALT. SUN (Jan. 19,
2016, 01:39 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-police-transparency-20160119-story.html [https://perma.cc/BKS5-HTJJ].
217. See The Editorial Board, Stop Hiding Police Misconduct in New York, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/stop-hiding-police-misconduct-in-new-york.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R38M-X2XN].
218. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 80.
219. See id.; see also CITY OF CHI. INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTH., supra note 206.
220. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 80.
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DEFERENCE

Blind deference to police officers, Professor L. Song Richardson has
noted, “does little to protect against arbitrary policing.”221 The United
States today is reaping the repercussions of decades of blind deference.
After years of allowing police departments and officers to operate with
virtual impunity, a slew of recent incidents in which police officers have
killed unarmed or non-violent African-Americans has garnered increased
public outrage.222 Still, many people—far more likely to be white than
people of color—choose to view these tragedies as isolated incidents,
rather than the natural manifestations of systemic deference to those in
power.223 Police misconduct is, unfortunately, not isolated at all.
A. Police Departments and Officers Regularly Abuse Their Power
with Few Repercussions
In 1981—thirteen years after the Terry decision, and well into the Supreme Court’s move toward extreme deference to police officers—a study
revealed that police officers in the United States are “more heavily armed
and they shoot more often than police in any other Western democracy.”224 That reality remains. In the first six months of 2016, United
States police officers killed 566 people—well over three per day, and the
221. See Richardson, supra note 116, at 1157; see also Herbert, supra note 9, at
152 (stating court system’s “blind adherence to the good cop paradigm” has allowed it to “continue to ignore the very real problems of improper conduct by law
enforcement officials”).
222. See, e.g., Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s
Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma
.cc/ZQE6-N4KS]; Mercy Benzaquen et al., The Videos That are Putting Race and Policing Into Sharp Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/us/police-videos-race.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=1
[https://perma.cc/YM3N-Y4TA]; Richard Fausset et al., Alton Sterling Shooting in
Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html [https://
perma.cc/33DD-3TBP]; Ford & Payne, supra note 5; Matt Furber & Richard Pérez
Peña, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama Calls Police Shootings “an American Issue”,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QQN7-MJDJ]; Goodman & Yee, supra note 5; Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/michael-brown-darren-wilson-ferguson-protests.html [https://perma.cc/N8PZ-5TYL] (discussing
public reaction to shooting death of Michael Brown); Michael Martinez, Report:
Autopsy Shows Freddie Gray Suffered “High-Energy Injury”, CNN (June 24, 2015), http:/
/www.cnn.com/2015/06/23//baltimore-freddie-gray-death-officers-indicted-pleas
[https://perma.cc/3BSH-DEY2].
223. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Systemic Racism or Isolated Abuses? Americans
Disagree, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/05/systemic-racism-or-isolated-abuse-americans-disagree/392570/ [https://
perma.cc/TA53-W8PC].
224. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the
Use of Deadly Force by Police, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 111 (1981).
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vast majority by gunshot.225 During those same six months, officers in
Texas alone killed fifty people—a mere five less than police officers in
England and Wales killed in the last twenty-four years combined.226 Police officers across the United States killed 2,318 people between January
1, 2014 and December 31, 2015.227 Official responses to such shootings
have been extremely deferential.228 Over a five-year period from 2010 to
2014, the Albuquerque Police Department killed twenty-eight people, and
until 2014—despite a Department of Justice report finding that the “majority” of those killings were unjustified—not one of the officers involved
in the twenty-eight killings had been charged with any crime.229 Similarly,
though the DOJ’s review of officer-involved shootings within the New Orleans Police Department revealed “many” instances of “clear policy violations” over just a two-year period, the police department itself had not
found an officer-involved shooting to violate policy in the last six years.230
The lack of accountability illustrated by these disturbing statistics has created a system where police departments can almost automatically reject or
ignore civilian complaints about police misconduct, with little fear of consequence. When the Department of Justice investigated the Ferguson Po225. See The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, http://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database [https://perma.cc/9GG9-AGGR] (last visited July 7, 2016); Fatal
Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/policeshootings-2016/?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/C4Z8-8V93] (last visited July 7,
2016).
226. See Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days Than Other
Countries Do in Years, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 06:00 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries
[https://perma.cc/85AS-95AN]; The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, supra
note 225.
227. See KILLED BY POLICE, http://killedbypolice.net/ [https://perma.cc/
759M-ZAW4] (last visited May 30, 2016). Because police departments are generally
not required to report how many people they have killed, and are often resistant to
doing so, no precise governmental statistics are available regarding these numbers.
A group of Harvard Medical Scientists recently called on United States public
health agencies to make police killings a “notifiable condition,” which would require police departments to report each killing to their corresponding Public
Health Department. See Dylan Sevett, Harvard Medical Scientists Say Police Killings
Should Be Recorded as Public Epidemic, U.S. UNCUT (Dec. 27, 2015), https://
web.archive.org/web/20170210013119/http://usuncut.com/black-lives-matter/
harvard-medical-police-killings-public-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/XTT2-5FHS].
228. See Robert M. Myers, Code of Silence: Police Shootings and the Right to Remain
Silent, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 505 (1996).
229. See Nick Pinto, When Cops Break Bad: Inside a Police Force Gone Wild, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/whencops-break-bad-albuquerque-police-force-gone-wild-20150129?page=2 [https://per
ma.cc/EL56-3SVP]; see also INVESTIGATION OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
supra note 155, at 2–3.
230. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE
DEPARTMENT vi, 18 (2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/74332/justice-department-report-on-the-new-orleans.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3XVL-8QXE].
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lice Department in the wake of Michael Brown’s death, it found that
Ferguson police officers “rarely respond meaningfully to civilian complaints of officer misconduct,” and such complaints had a “significant likelihood” of going uninvestigated.231 Out of 151 incidents in which officers
used force on civilians, supervisors and command staff approved all but
one.232 The Ferguson police chief himself admitted that he had never
once overturned a supervisor’s conclusion that use of force was reasonable.233 In Chicago, the Police Accountability Task Force found a department that systemically “sanctioned practices that led to the deaths of
fellow citizens and the deprivation of the rights of so many others.”234
Between 2007 and 2015, more than 1,500 Chicago police officers acquired
ten or more complaints against them, sixty-five accumulated at least thirty,
and two accumulated more than fifty.235 The Task Force noted a “general
absence of a culture of accountability” with the police department, concluding that although problem officers were well known within the department, the police department’s leadership and outside review agencies
took few steps to address the problems or remove the officers.236 The
message the police department and independent review agency sent to
Chicagoans was that “the police can act with impunity.”237
B. Abuses of Police Power Inordinately Target People of Color
As long as police misconduct has existed in this country, its victims
have been primarily people of color. Policing in America has a sordid
racial history, beginning with the existence of slave patrols in the South—
white men authorized by the community to patrol for black slaves out at
night against their masters’ will.238 After emancipation, many southern
states responded by enacting vagrancy laws, which criminalized people for
being unemployed, and were almost universally enforced against poor
black people—subjecting them to the punishment of forced labor, and in
effect ensuring a new, legal form of slavery.239 Policing was, as Professor
Ahmed White notes, an “institution of class control” primarily aimed at
subjugating poor people of color.240 Policing as an institution of racial
oppression continued on through the Jim Crow era, where many Ku Klux
231. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 200,
at 2, 83–86.
232. See id. at 39.
233. See id. at 41.
234. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 1.
235. See id. at 12.
236. See id. at 96.
237. See id. at 63, 81.
238. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Upside and Downside of Police Hunches and
Expertise, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 115, 124 (2007); Brown, supra note 15, at 760–61.
239. See Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the
Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913–1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 670, 679–80
(2004).
240. See id. at 671.
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Klan members served as police officers, and police departments routinely
sanctioned violence against black people.241 During the Civil Rights
Movement, police officers brutalized black protesters, enforced school segregation, and actively fought to keep black people from challenging white
privilege.242
Today, one need only scroll through a social media feed, and read
hashtags like #AltonSterling, #PhilandoCastile, or #SayHerName—memorializing just a few of the black men and women recently killed at the
hands of police officers243—to realize that racial injustices “continue[ ] to
play a significant role in police-citizen interactions.”244 Some police officers—many of whom manage to rise to prominent positions within police departments—are overtly racist. In Ferguson, Missouri, several highranking supervisors in the police department were in the group of people
who routinely forwarded racist emails.245 The chief of staff to the Los
Angeles County Sheriff was forced to resign in April of 2016, after the Los
Angeles Times discovered and made public a series of emails he had sent
invoking derogatory stereotypes of African-Americans, Latinos, and Muslims.246 In San Francisco, nine police officers under investigation for unrelated criminal activities were found to have sent numerous racist text
messages to each other, including messages urging each other to shoot a
black man, stating that mixed-race children are an “abomination,” calling
a black man a “monkey,” and praising white power.247 The police depart241. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 238, at 124; Brown, supra note 15, at
760–61.
242. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 238, at 124; Brown, supra note 15, at
760–61.
243. See #AltonSterling, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/hashtag/altonsterling
[https://perma.cc/QXM4-TMFG]; #PhilandoCastile, TWITTER, https://twitter
.com/hashtag/philandocastile [https://perma.cc/MPW4-ZKKA]; #SayHerName,
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/hashtag/sayhername [https://perma.cc/9KRQ76TG].
244. See Richardson, supra note 116, at 1148.
245. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 200,
at 71–72.
246. See Emails Sent by Tom Angel with Derogatory Stereotypes of Muslims, Latinos,
Blacks and Others, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), http://documents.latimes.com/
emails-sent-tom-angel-derogatory-stereotypes-muslims-latinos-blacks-and-others/
[https://perma.cc/KGR7-KFMZ]; Liam Stack, Los Angeles Police Official Resigns over
Racist Emails, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/
us/los-angeles-police-official-resigns-over-racist-emails.html?hp&action=click&pg
type=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region
=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=2 [https://perma.cc/N75W-EBN7]; Alene
Tchekmedyian & Cindy Chang, Top L.A. County Sheriff’s Officials Resign over Emails
Mocking Muslims and Others, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2016, 06:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriff-aid-tom-angel-resigns-emails-20160501story.html [https://perma.cc/J3QZ-ER5W].
247. See Beenish Ahmed, These Cops Are Probably Going to Get Away with Praising
White Power and Saying Black People Should Be Spayed, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 19,
2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/12/19/n3734044/sfpd-miscoduct/
[https://perma.cc/J3QZ-ER5W].

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 4

988

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 953

ment waited nearly two and one-half years after learning of the racist text
messages to fire any of the officers involved.248 A court later reinstated
the officers, finding that the police department had violated the one-year
statute of limitations for investigating police misconduct.249 In June of
2016, a federal judge found extensive evidence of intentional racial bias
against African-Americans by the San Francisco Police Department.250
And in Baltimore, the Department of Justice investigation revealed that
the Baltimore Police Department regularly fails to hold officers accountable for racial bias or use of racial slurs.251 Apart from recorded instances
of overt racism, empirical evidence also supports the claim that people of
color are the most likely targets of police violence.252 African-Americans
represent just 13% of the United States population, but account for more
than 30% of people killed by police.253 Between 2010 and 2014, unarmed
black people were 3.49 times more likely to be shot by police than unarmed white people.254 In Miami-Dade County, unarmed black people
were 22 times more likely to be shot by police than unarmed white people,
and in the counties that encompass Los Angeles and New Orleans, unarmed black people were 10 times more likely to be shot by police than
their white counterparts.255 In Cook County, Chicago, unarmed black
248. See Vivian Ho, S.F. Cops Who Wrote Racist Text Messages Win Court Ruling,
SF GATE (Dec. 21, 2015, 04:45 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Judgerules-in-favor-of-S-F-cops-who-wrote-6713191.php [https://perma.cc/J3QZ-ER5W].
249. See id.
250. See Vivian Ho & Bob Egelko, Federal Judge Finds Evidence of Racial Bias by
S.F. Police, SF GATE (June 30, 2016), http://m.sfgate.com/news/article/Federaljudge-finds-evidence-of-racial-bias-by-8335739.php [https://perma.cc/J3QZER5W].
251. See INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 10, at 8.
252. See Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001).
253. See Sendhil Mullainathan, Police Killings of Blacks: Here Is What the Data
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/upshot/
police-killings-of-blacks-what-the-data-says.html [https://perma.cc/4FPQ-C5PP].
The disproportionate representation of minorities as targets of police suspicions
plays out across the spectrum of the justice system. See generally, e.g., Loic Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139 DOEDALUS, 74, 74
(2010) (discussing how police, courts, and corrections system have systematically
targeted the “black underclass” for decades); ROBYNN J.A. COX, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? MASS INCARCERATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS 6 (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/MassIncarcerationReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4J7-QMUS].
254. See Cody T. Ross, Introducing the United States Police-Shooting Database: A
Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings at the County-Level in the
United States, 2011–2014 5 (PLos Research Paper) (Dec. 8, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534673 [https://perma.cc/P92FE4EZ]. These records included both police shootings that killed their victims, and
shootings where the victims survived. See id.
255. See id.; see also Officer Involved: A KPCC Investigation into Police Shootings in
Los Angeles County, KPCC, http://projects.scpr.org/officer-involved/#12 [https://
perma.cc/T9KQ-TZHU] (last visited May 26, 2016) (discussing how law enforce-
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people were 5 times more likely to be shot by police than armed white
people.256 In almost every county in the country, unarmed victims of police shootings were more likely to be black or Latino than white.257 Young
black men fare even worse: from 2010 through 2012, black teenagers between the ages of fifteen and nineteen were twenty-one times more likely
to be killed by police than their white counterparts.258 Professor Linda
Sheryl Greene has described police use of deadly force against unarmed
black men as
enabled by a legal jurisprudence of structural violence which provides no accountability for the societal marginalization and stigmatization of young Black men, as well as by a jurisprudence of
actual violence, which permits police officers to decide whom to
target and whom to kill with virtually no threat of criminal sanction or institutional civil liability.259
The reluctance—or outright refusal—to hold officers accountable for
violence represents deference in its worst form: unwillingness to secondguess an officer’s judgment even when it results in the death of an unarmed citizen.260 Mundane, daily interactions are also plagued with racial
bias. Police departments routinely discriminate against people of color in
stops and seizures.261 Professor Tracey Maclin describes “police targeting
of black people for excessive and disproportionate search and seizure” as
“a practice older than the Republic itself.”262 Between January 2004 and
June 2012, the New York Police Department made more than 4.4 million
stops.263 Although the city’s population is 23% black, 29% Hispanic, and
33% white, only 10% of the people stopped were white, while 80% were
black or Hispanic.264 Chicago police officers are roughly 4 times more
likely to search a black person’s car than a white person’s, despite evidence that white people are roughly twice as likely to have contraband in
their car.265 Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force found that African-Americans in Chicago had “disproportionately negative experiences
ment officers in Los Angeles County fatally shot black people at triple the rate of
white people).
256. See Ross, supra note 254, at 5.
257. See id. at 7.
258. See Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, in Black and White, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 10, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-inblack-and-white [https://perma.cc/DQ28-9V52]. This statistic is drawn from FBI
data for the years 2010–2012. See id.
259. See Greene, supra note 15, at 4.
260. See Solove, supra note 18, at 943.
261. See, e.g., Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big Data,
20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181 (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2787101
[https://perma.cc/K8B2-T8Y4].
262. See Maclin, supra note 10, at 333.
263. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
264. See id. at 556, 574.
265. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 39.
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with the police,” which included disproportionate use of force, traffic
stops, and pedestrian stops of African-Americans.266 Black residents of
Baltimore also report being regularly humiliated and abused by police officers, and the Department of Justice’s recent investigation into the Baltimore Police Department revealed that police officers routinely
and systematically conduct unconstitutional stops and searches of
African-American residents.267 One of the factors that likely contributes
to this discrimination is the discretion police officers are routinely afforded when deciding who to stop and who to arrest.268 Because the Supreme Court has shown extreme deference to police officers in deciding
the meaning of terms like probable cause and reasonable suspicion,269
police officers’ personal beliefs, biases, and prejudices are essentially absorbed into the law.270 This is particularly dangerous in poor and urban
areas, where research has shown that police officers working in these environments—many of which are predominantly populated by people of
color—tend to have higher degrees of implicit racial bias than officers
who work in majority-white areas.271 It is, as Justice Sotomayor recently
noted in her dissent in Strieff, “no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of” unconstitutional conduct by police officers.272 Even
when a person of color complains about police misconduct, racial bias
may taint the review of that complaint. Between 2011 to 2015, Chicago’s
complaint review agencies—the Bureau of Internal Affairs and the Independent Police Review Authority—received 17,500 complaints of police
misconducts, 61% of which were filed by African-Americans, while 21%
were filed by white people.273 Of the complaints sustained, however, only
25% were filed by African-Americans, while 58% were filed by white people.274 In other words, police misconduct complaints by white people

266. See id. at 13.
267. See INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra
note 10, at 7; Taibbi, supra note 13.
268. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 27 (1998).
269. See supra Part I(B)–(C).
270. See Davis, supra note 268, at 27; see also Luna, supra note 10, at 133, 178
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s authorization to frisk in the absence of crime
may be surprising to some . . . but it would be no news for those who live in
minority neighborhoods”); Camelia Simoiu et al., The Problem of Infra-Marginality in
Outcome Tests for Discrimination (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811449 [https:/
/perma.cc/PK2X-63GK] (surveying data from more than 100 police departments
and concluding that police officers are far more prone to search black or Hispanic
drivers than white or Asian drivers).
271. See Richardson, supra note 116, at 1160.
272. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
273. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 32.
274. See id.
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were 9 times more likely to be sustained than similar complaints by black
people.275
C. Deference Has a Demoralizing Effect on Communities of Color
A sad but common bond among people in many communities of
color is the experience of having been stopped or harassed by a police
officer without having committed any crime.276 In [E]racing the Fourth
Amendment, Professor Devon Carbado—a black man originally from England—tells of a time after he moved to the United States when police
officers, allegedly acting on a tip about black men with guns, removed him
and three relatives from their Los Angeles County home at gunpoint and
demanded to search their home.277 When they told their sister, still living
in England, what had happened, she filed a complaint with the police department, called the newspaper, and contacted the NAACP.278 Nothing
came of her complaints: the police, after all, were simply investigating a
crime, and it was insignificant that three black men had been terrified and
humiliated in the process.279 One devastating effect of this discriminatory
reality is fear. The decades of biased policing people of color have
endured—particularly when set against a more recent backdrop of
highly-publicized shootings of black people by police officers—has created
a current epoch in which many people of color are terrified of interacting
with the police.280 Black people at all income levels are more likely to fear
encounters with police officers than their white counterparts.281 But the
fear is not new: Gallup polls conducted biannually since 1985 show that,
over the past thirty years, consistently less than half of surveyed minorities
nationwide express confidence that the police will either serve or protect
them, and many believe that the police would be willing to use excessive
275. See id. at 40.
276. See Brown, supra note 15, at 763; Harris, supra note 15, at 679–80 (“Many
African-American males can recount an instance in which police stopped and
questioned them or someone they knew for no reason, even physically abusing or
degrading them in the process.”); Ronner, supra note 23, at 394 (“One basic truth
underlies the African American experience within the criminal justice system:
racism.”).
277. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 947–64 (2002).
278. See id. at 964.
279. See id.
280. As just one example, see Taryn Finley, #IfIDieInPoliceCustody: Twitter Responds to Sandra Bland’s Death with Heartbreaking Hashtag, HUFFINGTON POST (July
17, 2015, 12:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-responds-tothe-suspiciousness-of-sandra-blands-death-with-ifidieinpolicecustody_55a8feeee4b0
4740a3dfa386 [https://perma.cc/J4D9-SA7C]; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Federal
Programs and the Real Cost of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 910–11 (2015) (noting
that even common police coercions such as stops and arrests have substantial consequences, including increased fear and distrust of law enforcement).
281. See Sklansky, supra note 15, at 314.
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force on them.282 For generations, non-white parents have sat their children down and talked with them about how to behave to police officers, in
a way few white families feel the need to: don’t run, don’t make any sudden movements, keep your hands where the officers can see them, don’t
look the officer in the eye.283 People of color are also significantly less
likely to believe in the legitimacy of police officers and policing tactics.
The Department of Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police Department
revealed that Ferguson’s pattern of “unconstitutional policing,” which the
Ferguson police have operated freely for years, has “undermin[ed] law
enforcement legitimacy among African Americans in particular.”284 A recent Chicago survey revealed that only 6% of African-Americans in the city
believed that Chicago police officers treated everyone fairly.285 When
communities of color fear the police, believe they will receive unfair treatment, and question their legitimacy, the natural result is that they also
attempt to avoid contact with the police.286 In many minority communities, these efforts go so far as to avoid even reporting crimes, from a fear
that police officers will treat them as suspects rather than witnesses or victims—a concept foreign to most white people.287 This is not how the
world should work: ordinary civilians should not be afraid to report crime,
and should not live with the worry that the person entrusted by the government to protect them will actually be the one to harm them. Yet for
many people of color, that is the reality in which they live.
282. See Justin McCarthy, Nonwhites Less Likely to Feel Police Protect and Serve
Them, GALLUP (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179468/nonwhitesless-likely-feel-police-protect-serve.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BM6-G38A]. While
the percentage of white people who expressed confidence in the police has risen
as high as 72% during this same time period, the percentage of minorities expressing the same confidence has never been over 52%, and has fallen as low as 33%.
See id.; see also Jens Manuel Krogstad, Latino Confidence in Local Police Lower Than
Among Whites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2014/08/28/latino-confidence-in-local-police-lower-than-among-whites/
[https://perma.cc/7DB2-FT53] (concluding that Hispanics are significantly less
likely than white people to express confidence in the ability of the police to treat
races equally, avoid excessive force, or do “a good job enforcing the law”).
283. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015); W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK
(1903)).
284. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 200,
at 2, 15.
285. See Editorial Board, When Chicagoans Don’t Trust Police, the City Suffers, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2016, 05:40 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
editorials/ct-cops-tribune-poll-police-chicato-edit-0204-jm-20160203-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5HWD-N9PF].
286. See Carbado, supra note 277, at 966; Harris, supra note 15, at 679–80.
287. See, e.g., Hannah-Jones, supra note 9; see also Wayne Drash, Poll: 1 in 5
Blacks Report “Unfair” Dealings with Police in Last Month, CNN (Nov. 30, 2015, 08:29
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/29/us/criminal-justice-racism-cnn-kff-poll/
[https://perma.cc/WGL8-RECC].
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DEFERENCE

As much as the law serves to reflect social norms, it also, by the same
token, solidifies social prejudices. The law is, as Professor Ian Haney Lopez has noted, “a prime instrument in the construction and reinforcement
of racial subordination.”288 Whether wittingly or not, the legal system’s
deeply-ingrained deference to police officers has, for decades, effectively
rubberstamped the widespread mistreatment of minorities, and allowed
police departments to turn a blind eye to abuses by their own officers. It is
long past time to hold police departments accountable for misconduct.
That is what this part aims to do: provide concrete suggestions for dismantling the system of deference that has long plagued review of police misconduct complaints, and replacing it with a system that effectively
responds to civilian complaints and holds officers accountable for their
abuses.
A. Stop Letting Police Departments Police Themselves
Entrusting police departments with the responsibility of policing
themselves is the ultimate form of deference. But, as detailed in Part II,
police departments have squandered the trust afforded them by protecting their officers from investigation, refusing to sustain complaints, and
imposing few consequences for officers who commit even blatant misconduct.289 Police officers’ ability to mistreat civilians—sometimes violently—
with near impunity “is due in no small part to internal review systems that
routinely turn their backs to police misconduct.”290 Adopting an external
oversight model is the first step toward building community trust, by giving outside reviewers a meaningful voice into how the police department
operates and what measures can be taken to improve it. The past several
decades have seen a small but significant shift away from relying on internal affairs units to review misconduct complaints, and the number of cities
with civilian review boards has proliferated.291 The National Association
for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement provides a resource list, which
does not purport to be exhaustive, of 121 cities and counties with civilian
oversight agencies.292 Many, however, lack the authority either to review
certain types of misconduct complaints or to impose discipline when they
determine it is merited.293 For example, although New York Police De288. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
289. See supra Part II.
290. See Moran, supra note 17, at 853.
291. See WALKER, supra note 140, at 40–44.
292. See Police Oversight by Jurisdiction (USA), NAT’L ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENF’T, http://www.nacole.org/police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa
[https://perma.cc/HE3M-MFL4] (last visited June 21, 2016).
293. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-57-040(c) (2007); CINCINNATI, OHIO,
MUN. CODE art. 28, § 1 (2002); BLAKE NORTON ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DE-
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partment officers have a long history of making false statements in police
reports or to investigative bodies, the Citizen Complaint Review Board is
not authorized to investigate false statement cases; complaints about false
statements are automatically referred to the Internal Affairs Unit.294 Albuquerque’s new Civilian Police Oversight Agency (CPOA), which was created by the Albuquerque City Council in 2014 after the Department of
Justice found the previous oversight model grossly ineffective, authorizes
the CPOA only to recommend discipline, which the police chief is then
free to decline.295 Restricting review agencies in this way hinders their
efforts to achieve meaningful reform. Where police departments have
proven consistently ineffective in addressing misconduct, it is well past
time to stop deferring to their judgment, and instead authorize independent review agencies to review all complaints.296
B. Create Independent Review Agencies That Are Staffed Primarily by
Civilians, Rather Than Law Enforcement Officers
Independent review agencies are not truly independent when they
are staffed primarily by former (or even current) law enforcement officers.297 The best leaders listen to their constituents, and police departments should be no exception to that rule. A better model of governance
is one that incorporates input from members of the public who have no
ties to the police department, including those who have been specifically
critical of the police. Adding civilian voices to the review process allows
outsiders to identify deficiencies in current police practices and forces authorities to confront the perspectives of the people most affected by police
misconduct. It also adds legitimacy to the reform effort—when the public
participates, it is more likely to support that effort and invest in its success—and promotes transparency in resolving complaints.298 Several cities in recent years have made concerted efforts to diversify and legitimize
the agencies responsible for reviewing police misconduct complaints. In
2002, Cincinnati formed the Citizen Complaint Authority in response to a
class-action lawsuit by Cincinnati citizens against the City of Cincinnati and
the Cincinnati Police Department, alleging widespread misconduct and
racially-biased policing.299 The city decided to staff the Citizen Complaint
PARTMENT
98 (2015), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p316-pub.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MFF-MNKD]; INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF
POLICE, supra note 181, at 41.
294. See N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 197, at x–xi.
295. ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., POLICE OVERSIGHT ORDINANCE, § 9-4-1-4(C)(3)(C)
(2014).
296. See Moran, supra note 17, at 882.
297. See supra Part II(C).
298. See Moran, supra note 17, at 884–85.
299. See Collaborative Agreement at 2, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D.
395 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (No. C-1-99-317), http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservid/27A205F1-69E9-4446-BC18BD146CB73DF2/showMeta/0/ [https://perma
.cc/SK5C-7QRG].
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Authority with three categories of employees: (1) a board of seven citizens
appointed by the mayor; (2) an executive director and support staff, appointed by the city manager in consultation with the review board; and (3)
a team of professional investigators.300 The settlement agreement required the board to be comprised of a “diverse array of seven individuals,
from a cross-section of the Cincinnati community, who have the requisite
education and experience to impartially review evidence and render judgments on alleged officer misconduct.”301 To staff the board, the mayor
was required to accept nominations from fifty-two different community
councils within the city, as well as businesses, civic and social service agencies, and other organizations.302 To alleviate any concern that civilians
might not have the requisite training or expertise to resolve police misconduct complaints, each member of the board is required, before taking office, to complete a basic training course that includes classes at the
Cincinnati Police Academy, instruction in constitutional and criminal protections, and ride-alongs with Cincinnati police officers.303 Newark’s recently-formed Civilian Complaint Review Board also stresses the
importance of diverse civilian viewpoints. The Review Board is composed
of nine members, one of whom the city’s inspector general selects, three
of whom are the municipal council appoints, and five of whom local and
civil rights organizations, including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union,
vote in.304 No more than one member may be a former employee of the
Newark Police Department.305 In Chicago, the Police Accountability Task
Force report echoed sentiments similar to those behind the reforms in
Cincinnati and Newark, concluding that “real and lasting change is possible only when the people most affected by policing have a voice.”306 Recognizing that most Chicagoans have “long been shut out of Chicago’s
police oversight system,” the task force called for a revamped oversight
system that includes members of the community, who are “critical to ensuring that officers are held accountable for misconduct.”307 The Task
Force also recommended that previous Chicago Police Department em300. See id. at 18, 20.
301. See id. at 18.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 19.
304. See RAS BARAKA, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, EXECUTIVE
ORDER (2014), http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ExecutiveOrder-CivilianComplaintReviewBoardwithRules_FINAL.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6U5W-V42Y] (establishing Civilian Complaint Review Board through executive
order by Mayor in Newark, New Jersey); see also Daniel Ross, Newark’s New Disciplinary Board Could Flex Rare Muscle over Police, YES! MAG. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www
.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/newarks-new-civilian-board-could-wield-rare-disciplinary-muscle-over-police-20150911 [https://perma.cc/U3SF-4G63].
305. See BARAKA, supra note 304.
306. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 5,
7–10.
307. See id. at 14.
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ployees, as well as employees of the State’s Attorney’s Office, be prohibited
from serving as investigators or the Chief Administrator of the review
agency.308
C. Mandate Use of Early Intervention Systems
Although early intervention systems have been around for several decades, as of 2010 more than two-thirds of police departments with at least
100 officers still did not use them.309 Evidence suggests that early intervention systems can indeed reduce police misconduct.310 Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force recently called for the police department to
implement a functional early intervention system to identify problem officers,311 and the White House has also invested money and effort into
reforming early warning systems by making the information obtained
more accessible to the public. The White-House-sponsored Police Data
Initiative, which began in 2015, recruits police departments to submit
their data archives on police-citizen encounters for analysis and suggestions on how the data can be used to reform police departments and remove problem officers.312 Unfortunately, even the limited number of
police departments that do have early intervention systems often do not
use them properly.313 Accordingly, I recommend that early intervention
systems be managed by independent review agencies, rather than the police departments themselves.314 Early intervention systems would allow review agencies to recommend (or require) additional training for officers
who are the subject of complaints, or identify them within the department
to discourage the identified officers and their colleagues from future misconduct. It would also help review agencies identify which officers deserve
serious discipline or termination for their misconduct: an officer who has
had multiple complaints and continued his behavior should be removed
308. See id. at 81.
309. See Schwartz, supra note 152, at 1066.
310. See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 841, 858 n.97 (2012) (citing SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS:
RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM POLICE OFFICER 27 (2001) (finding police officers
were named in one-half or one-third as many civilian complaints after intervention, but none of the departments studied track legal claims in their early intervention systems).
311. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 18.
312. See Andrew Tarantola, White House Launches the Police Data Initiative, ENGADGET (May 18, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/05/18/white-houselaunches-the-police-data-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/89KU-D2TW]; see also
Megan Smith & Roy L. Austin, Jr., Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITE HOUSE
(May 18, 2015, 06:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/
launching-police-data-initiative [https://perma.cc/XTN6-S6M7].
313. See supra Part II(A).
314. See Moran, supra note 17, at 882; see also Schwartz, supra note 153, at 1063
(“[E]ven with functional early intervention systems, supervisors may analyze information from the system in a biased manner.”).
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from the force, whereas an officer’s first complaint may, depending on the
type of misconduct, deserve less serious discipline.315
D. Eliminate Special Treatment for Police Officers
During Misconduct Investigations
The extreme deference afforded to police officers who are the subject
of misconduct investigations does much to permit, and even facilitate, that
misconduct. A 2008 study showed that police departments with collective
bargaining agreements were significantly less likely to utilize civilian review
of misconduct claims or adopt policing reforms.316 More recently, a 2016
study reviewing seventeen consent decrees reached between local governments, police departments, and the Justice Department revealed that in at
least seven cases, the cities’ collective bargaining agreements presented a
roadblock to important reforms required by the settlements.317 Although
I certainly do not call for the abolition of police unions, I do suggest reforms to many collective bargaining agreements. The “48-hour rule” (or
others like it), allowing officers to wait 48 hours or more before being
questioned about an incident of suspected misconduct, should be abolished.318 Among other things, the rule has been criticized for giving the
impression—correctly—that police officers “have more rights than anyone
else in a criminal investigation.”319 That is a fair criticism: although defenders of the rule say it allows police officers to collect themselves emotionally and fully recollect the events of the incident, police departments
certainly do not afford that same right to civilian witnesses when police
officers want to question them.320 My point is not that officers should not
be allowed to consult with lawyers—particularly in a criminal investigation,
they do and should have that right—but that they are provided far more
protections than an ordinary citizen would be under the same circumstances, which detracts from the legitimacy of the investigation and pro315. See Moran, supra note 17, at 894–95.
316. See Veatch, supra note 163.
317. See Emmanuel, supra note 163; see also Adeshina Emmanuel, Why Black
Lives Matter Is Taking on Police Unions, IN THESE TIMES (July 22, 2016, 07:58 PM),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/19318/why_black_lives_matter_is_tak
ing_on_police_unions [https://perma.cc/Z9KK-EVBA].
318. See supra Part II(D).
319. See Waldman, supra note 166.
320. E.g., Laurie P. Cohen, New York Rules Mean It’s Tough to Convict Police in
Diallo Case, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 1999, 09:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB923369461908946544 [https://perma.cc/Q2JV-KN9N] (noting that, in aftermath of the Amadou Diallo shooting, officers could not be interviewed until more
than 48 hours later, and quoting former officer saying, “The cops in New York
enjoy a degree of protection that doesn’t exist in other places and is unwarranted”); see, e.g., Heard, supra note 169, at 138 (concluding that 48-hour rule is
“entirely unnecessary and should be eliminated”); Lee, supra note 166; see also Keenan & Walker, supra note 163, at 212 (noting that “[n]o law enforcement officer
would countenance a time bar on proceeding with the investigation of a crime by
civilians”).
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vides officers time to falsify their stories. Even if not eliminated
completely, the rule should at a minimum be amended to require that
officers involved in the misconduct not consult with each other during
that time period. Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force has recommended that the collective bargaining provisions requiring investigators to
delay officer interviews for at least 24 hours “should be revised to ensure
that officers are separated and remain separated from other officers until
all officers have given statements.”321 When the Department of Justice
entered into a consent decree with the Los Angeles Police Department,
the decree contained a similar provision, requiring that all officers in an
officer-involved shooting be separated immediately after the incident, and
kept separate until after interviews were finished.322 Police officers should
also not be allowed to attend each other’s interviews. In multiple
officer-involved shooting investigations in the Albuquerque Police Department, other officers who were involved in the incident were allowed to
participate in the shooting officer’s interview, a practice which law enforcement officers would not countenance with civilian witnesses, for the
obvious reason that it encourages collaboration in recounting how the incident occurred.323 Union rules like those in Chicago, requiring investigators to give police officers notice of questions ahead of time, and then
amend their statements if found to be inconsistent with video or audio
evidence, should also be eliminated.324 These rules are essentially a free
pass for officers to provide false statements: if evidence is found to refute
the statements, the officers can simply change them.
E. Provide Mediation Opportunities Between Complaining Citizens
and the Officers Accused
Mediation, in which a police officer accused of misconduct meets
with the complaining civilian, carries the potential for several benefits. It
draws police officers out from under the shroud in which they normally
operate, and forces each party to at least hear, if not understand, each
other’s position. It also requires police officers to be accountable to someone other than their colleagues.325 And it provides a hope of restorative
justice, in which the community member and accused officer have an opportunity to reconcile after airing grievances.326 Mediation can also re321. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 74.
322. See Los Angeles Police Department Consent Decree at 24, United States
v. City of L.A., (C.D. Cal. Jun 15, 2001), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/
final_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL4J-VGH5].
323. See INVESTIGATION OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 155,
at 28.
324. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 18;
Emmanuel, supra note 163.
325. See Samuel Walker & Carol Archbold, Mediating Citizen Complaints Against
the Police: An Exploratory Study, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 10–11 (2000).
326. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 78.
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duce the threat of implicit racial bias and stereotyping, which is a major
problem in policing today.327 Studies have shown that police officers are
more likely to pay close attention to people of color, interpret their behavior as suspicious, and behave aggressively toward them.328 These biases
can, however, be reduced through increased awareness and commitment
to reducing stereotypes, which face-to-face meetings facilitate.329
Police-citizen mediation programs are relatively rare. As of 2000, only
fourteen active police-citizen mediation programs existed nationwide, in a
country with more than 17,000 state and federal law enforcement agencies.330 But some have taken flight in recent years, with promising results.
A three-year study of Denver’s citizen-police mediation program, which
requires officers and civilians to participate in face-to-face mediation in a
neutral setting, revealed that both officers and complainants who participated in mediation had significantly higher satisfaction rates with the complaint process than those who went through the standard, formal
investigation process.331 A study of the Denver mediation program found
that nearly 60% of complainants were satisfied with the outcome, and a
full 75% were satisfied with the process.332 In contrast, civilians who participated in the traditional complaint review process during the same time
period, without mediation, reported only seven percent satisfaction with
the outcome and 12% satisfaction with the process.333 Officers’ rates of
satisfaction after mediation were noticeably higher after as well—approximately 68% were satisfied with the outcome, and nearly 80% with the process, while only about half of officers reported satisfaction with the
traditional complaint outcomes, and 20% with the process.334 Additionally, officers who participated in mediation received fewer citizen complaints after mediation than officers who did not, with an especially
significant decrease for minor complaints such as discourtesy and improper police procedures.335 The Pasadena Police Department has also
experimented with a police-citizen mediation program that was entirely
327. See Richardson, supra note 13, at 2042–52.
328. See id. at 2053 n.98 (citing Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric
Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 677 (2004); Jennifer L.
Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants
Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 385 (2006); and Robert
W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really Priming? Cue-Based Versus
Category-Based Processing of Facial Stimuli, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 17
(2002)).
329. See Richardson, supra note 13, at 2054.
330. See Walker & Archbold, supra note 325, at 235–36.
331. See JON L. PROCTOR ET AL., DENVER’S CITIZEN/POLICE COMPLAINT MEDIATION PROGRAM: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION Abstract (Feb. 24, 2009), https://
www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/documents/Mediation_Journal_Article_2-24-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/255J-Q5PL].
332. See id. at 18.
333. See id. at 17.
334. See id. at 18.
335. See id. at Abstract.
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voluntary for both the police officer and complainant.336 The department
offered mediation for complaints alleging “police tactics, police procedure, quality of service, and rudeness or discourtesy.”337 Although the
sample was quite small, both police officers and citizens in the Pasadena
program reported a high rate of satisfaction with the mediation.338 Other
cities are beginning to follow suit. After the Albuquerque Police Department was investigated by the Department of Justice and found to have a
pattern and practice of civil rights violations, Albuquerque’s City Council
created a new Civilian Police Oversight Agency in 2014.339 The ordinance
creating the agency has a “Mediation First” clause, which requires that mediation, “[w]henever possible,” be the first option for resolution of civilian
complaints.340 Eugene, Oregon has a mediation program where, if the
police officer and complaining party both agree to participate in mediation facilitated by a third-party, mediation can occur in lieu of investigation and discipline.341 San Francisco’s Office of Citizen Complaints also
offers mediation as an option for resolution of civilian complaints.342 The
goal of the mediation is to improve relationships between civilians and
police officers, and provide each side an opportunity to explain why certain actions occurred.343
F. Where Necessary, Impose Meaningful Discipline
Truly serious misconduct must truly be taken seriously. An officer
who is, for example, overtly racist has no place on a police force. When
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority found in 2015 that numerous police officers had racially discriminated against civilians—by using words the agency described as “racially biased language,” “racial
comments,” “racially offensive comments,” and “ethnically biased language”—the agency recommended only minor suspensions of no more
336. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUAPILOT COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAM: THE PASADENA POLICE-COMMUNITY
MEDIATION AND DIALOG PROGRAM 26 (2008), http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/54ba6a68e4b0c2baff90886c/14215030806
51/e070825154.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9AJ-37RR].
337. See id. at 23.
338. See id. at 29–31.
339. See ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., POLICE OVERSIGHT ORDINANCE, §§ 9-4-1-1–14
(2014).
340. See id. §§ 9-4-1-4(C)(3)(e), 9-4-1-6(C)(3).
341. See EUGENE, OR., EUGENE POLICE OPERATIONS MANUAL, Policy 1020,
§ 1020.7.2 (2015), http://coeapps.eugene-or.gov/EPD_POM_EXT/DocView.aspx
?id=1393648&searchid=24203099-627a-4047-a79e-809f3e672827&dbid=0 [https://
perma.cc/STP8-6CEA].
342. See S.F. OFFICE OF CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, CITIZEN-POLICE MEDIATION PROGRAM BROCHURE, https://sfgov.org/occ/ftp/uploadedfiles/occ/mediation_eng
lish.pdf [https://perma.cc/67PN-TWJD] (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
343. See id.
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than a few days for each officer.344 This does nothing more than reinforce the belief—already widely-held in Chicago’s African-American communities—that police officers can treat people of color poorly without
repercussions.345 Officers who lie during misconduct investigations, or retaliate against civilians who have complained of police misconduct, should
also be subject to termination.346 A recent report assessing Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority suggested that, when the agency finds
that a police officer “deliberately concealed or failed to disclose information” about a fellow officer’s misconduct, the agency should recommend
dismissal from the force.347 The Department of Justice came to the same
conclusion in Ferguson, recommending that officers found untruthful in
the performance of their duties, including responding to misconduct investigations, be fired.348 Corrupt police officers not only harm the communities they are hired to protect, but also do immense damage to the
integrity and reputation of the police department itself.
G.

Require Review Agencies to Make Information Regarding Misconduct
Complaints and Their Resolutions Publicly Available

“Sunlight,” Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously penned,
“is said to be the best of disinfectants.”349 Proponents of keeping misconduct complaints and their resolutions unavailable to the public generally
invoke the police departments’ interest in protecting the reputation and
morale of police officers who have been accused or found to have committed misconduct.350 But ignored in that argument is the public’s interest
in assessing whether police departments and review agencies are actually
and fairly investigating misconduct and, where appropriate, imposing appropriate discipline.351 Providing public access to information about misconduct complaints and resolutions would allow civilians the opportunity
344. See CITY OF CHI. INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTH., supra note 206. The report
does not provide any specific descriptions of the racially offensive language that
the officers used. See id.
345. See Editorial Board, supra note 285.
346. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 87.
347. See RON SAFER ET AL., PREVENTING AND DISCIPLINING POLICE MISCONDUCT:
AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHICAGO’S POLICE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 4–5, 23 (2014), https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/
dam/city/progs/safety/Preventing_Disciplining_Police_Misconduct_Dec_2014
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HW6-YMY3].
348. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 209,
at 96.
349. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 62 (1914).
350. See Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line:
Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files, 22 COMM. LAW. 34, 37 (2004); Richard
Winton, Privacy Often Trumps Transparency with Police Shooting Videos, L.A. TIMES
(May 19, 2015, 7:27 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-police-cameras-20150520-story.html [https://perma.cc/PNR2-J955].
351. See Zansberg & Campos, supra note 350, at 34, 37.
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to assess whether their police department takes these complaints seriously,
and would take a step toward removing police departments and officers
from the veil of secrecy under which many of them currently operate.352
Even the International Association of Chiefs of Police has stated that releasing data about police misconduct and civilian complaints is “sound
public policy.”353 Several months after the Laquan McDonald shooting
video rocked Chicago, setting off a firestorm of protests and ultimately
leading to the removal of the police superintendent, chief of police detectives, Cook County State’s Attorney, and head of the Independent Police
Review Authority,354 the new head of the Review Authority—in an effort
to address the criticism it had received for lack of transparency in reviewing police misconduct—released hundreds of videos of incidents in the
past several years in which police officers killed or injured civilians.355
The agency’s new chief also released a statement saying,
These past few months, as the city has struggled with so many
questions about policing and about police accountability, it has
been clear that we all agree that there is a lack of trust, and that
increased transparency is essential to rebuilding that trust . . . .
Today represents an important first step toward that.356
While the release of videos is indeed an important (and seemingly
obvious) first step, much more can be done to provide the public access to
information on potential police misconduct. Los Angeles’s Office of Inspector General has recommended that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
352. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 12, at 1833, 1848; see also Ken
Armstrong, How to Fix American Policing, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 13, 2016), https:/
/www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/13/how-to-fix-american-policing?utm_
vmedium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=openingstatement&utm
_term=newsletter-20160713-540#.H7t6eWs0L [https://perma.cc/P54B-TCHF]
(“[T]he criminal justice system, including policing, suffers from a stunning data
gap.”).
353. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A LEADERSHIP GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 104 (2006), http://
www.iacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/PCR_LdrshpGde_Part2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
56EH-ERPG].
354. See Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Mayor Rahm Emanuel Fires Chicago Police
Superintendent, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/
us/chicago-police-rahm-emanuel-laquan-mcdonald.html [https://perma.cc/5SESPCAJ]; Jeremy Gorner, Chief of Detectives Retires from Chicago Police Amid Fallout from
Video, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 8, 2015, 07:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-chief-of-detectives-retires-met-20151207-story
.html [https://perma.cc/GLF9-PR29]; Claire Landsbaum, Prosecutor Anita Alvarez
Loses Chicago Reelection in Wake of Laquan McDonald Controversy, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 16,
2016, 03:23 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/03/chicago-prosecutor-anita-alvarez-ousted.html [https://perma.cc/B8HH-ZC45].
355. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Richard Pérez-Peña, Chicago Releases Videos of
Police Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/
us/chicago-police-misconduct.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&referer=https:/
t.co/719B9htynX [https://perma.cc/8WLM-565F].
356. Id.
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Department regularly disclose data about civilian complaints and discipline imposed, as well as recorded uses of force or deputy-involved shootings.357 Data about arrests and investigatory stops, as well as the race of
the parties stopped and arrested, is also important to track whether police
departments are demonstrating racial animus or predilection in their encounters with citizens.358 Disciplinary information, allowing the public to
track how many complaints an officer has received and how many have
been sustained, should also be available online.359 Review agencies
should issue annual reports indicating the number of complaints individual officers receive each year, what types of complaints each officer received, and a short summary of the factual allegations, as well as how many
complaints against each officer were sustained, and why.360
V. CONCLUSION
In his book David and Goliath, Malcolm Gladwell writes, “Our definition of what is right is, as often as not, simply the way that people in positions of privilege close the door on those on the outside.”361 For decades,
the legal system has accepted—quite deliberately in many cases, and simply unquestioningly in others—the premise that deference to police officers is “what is right.” It is time to rethink our definition of what is right.
Our legal system has all too frequently closed the door on people of color,
and police departments and officers have all too frequently enabled, or
led the way in, these exclusions. Our nation’s police departments desperately need to be reformed. Although these reforms must occur in many
areas, one aspect of this reform is changing the way we review misconduct
complaints. And it is the people in positions of privilege—often white—
who must stop burying their heads in the proverbial sand and acknowledge the damage that decades of deference has done.

357. See CTY. OF L.A. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, RECOMMENDATION TO THE
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT FOR PUBLIC DATA DISCLOSURE 1
(2014), https://oig.lacounty.gov/Portals/OIG/Reports/Data%20Disclosure%20
Recommendation.pdf?ver=2015-01-14-170415-567 [https://perma.cc/X6ZB4SFX].
358. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 18;
see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 659–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
359. See CHICAGO POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 143, at 18;
see also CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, CHICAGO NEEDS TO REPORT MORE COMPREHENSIVE DATA ABOUT HOW IT PROCESSES MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE
4–5 (2015), http://files.ctctcdn.com/48087546001/8e90e9e6-e26c-42fd-adb0-76
8de52ce936.pdf [https://perma.cc/M984-XADS].
360. See Moran, supra note 17, at 896.
361. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH 190 (2013).
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